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INTRODUCTION
"But s/he said that s/he was eighteen." That this defense will probably
be unsuccessful is as old a story as the 1875 case that every first-year law
student reads in Criminal Law.' The story goes something like this. A fif-
teen-year old, who plausibly looks eighteen, tells a nineteen-year old that
s/he is eighteen. Reasonably relying on the juvenile being above the age of
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Member, Oklahoma Bar Association. The authors thank Charles Adams, Mitchell Berman,
Robert Butkin, Catherine Carpenter, Joshua Dressier, Christina Jenkins, Linda Lacey, Kay Levine,
Wayne Logan, Gerard Lynch, Peter Oh, Tamara Piety, Richard Posner, Joshua Solberg, and James
Thomas for their helpful comments. We also thank participants in presentations at William Mitchell
College of Law and The University of Tulsa College of Law for their helpful questions and comments.
I See R v. Prince, (1875) 2 L.R.C.C.R. 138, 145 (affirming defendant's conviction for taking an
unmarried girl below the age of sixteen from the custody of her father despite the jury finding that the
victim "told the prisoner that she was eighteen years of age, that he believed that she was eighteen years
of age, and that he had reasonable grounds for so believing").
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consent, the nineteen-year old agrees to engage in intercourse with the fif-
teen-year old. As any issue-spotting first-year law student might instantly
surmise, this is a story about statutory rape2 and the strict liability3 rule that
a mistake about the victim's age, even when induced by the victim's false
representation, is no defense.' In "the immemorial tradition of the common
law,"5 and in most jurisdictions today, the nineteen-year old will be guilty
of statutory rape.6
But this story also depicts another type of rape-with the roles of per-
petrator and victim reversed-that has never before been noticed. By one
and the same act of intercourse, the fifteen-year old victim of statutory rape
is simultaneously a perpetrator of rape. By obtaining intercourse with the
nineteen-year old through a false representation of a significant or material
2 The term "statutory rape" commonly refers to the criminal offense of engaging in sexual inter-
course with a person below a specified number of years of age, varying by jurisdiction, but typically be-
low sixteen. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) (1997 & Supp. 2005) (below fourteen
years of age); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) (below eighteen years of age);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005) (below sixteen years of age); Charles A.
Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of Reason, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1,
61 (1997) (noting that "the most common age of consent is sixteen (i.e., the consent of victims up to the
age of fifteen is irrelevant)"); Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the
Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 314 (2003) (same). Some
jurisdictions also require the perpetrator to be a specified number of years older than the victim. See,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(4) (West 2005) (defining sexual assault as including where "[t]he
victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim").
For a further discussion of statutory rape, see infra Part III.A.
3 While there may be no single accepted conception, strict liability commonly refers to an offense
that does not require proof of mens rea for at least one of its elements. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 143 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that strict liability offenses "do not require
a mens rea requirement for one or more of the elements of the actus reus"); Douglas N. Husak, Varieties
of Strict Liability, 8 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 189, 191 (1995) (same). Statutory rape is widely considered a
strict liability offense because it typically does not require proof of mens rea regarding the element of
the age of the victim. See, e.g., Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 49 (Md. 1999) (commenting that statutory
rape is a strict liability crime because it bars a defense based on mistake of age of the victim);
DRESSLER, supra, at 145 (explaining that the offense is typically termed strict liability because it does
not require a "mens rea element regarding the defendant's knowledge of the female's underage status").
4 See, e.g., State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 784 (R.I. 1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting) (noting that the
majority rule is that the defendant's honest and reasonable mistake as to the victim's age will not be a
defense to statutory rape); State v. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 822 n.49 (Wis. 2004) ("A minority of
states allow some form of a 'belief about age' defense by judicial decision or by statute."); Catherine L.
Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
313, 316-17 (2003) (same). For a further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
5 State v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220, 226 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., concurring) (referring to the long-
standing rule that statutory rape is a strict liability offense precluding a defense for mistake of age).
6 See supra notes 2-5; see also Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d at 818-19 (denying an affirmative defense to
statutory rape for a mistake as to victim's age even when based on victim's intentional misrepresentation
of age); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 779 (3d ed. 2000) ("The traditional approach initially ac-
cepted in virtually every state has been to view the crime of statutory rape ... so that the defendant had
no defense because of his mistaken belief as to age, no matter how reasonable the belief and no matter
whether it was based upon the girl's own representations or her mature appearance."); infra Part III.A.
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matter,7 the fifteen-year old commits rape by fraud.8 The age of one's sex-
ual partner is a crucially significant and material matter when it makes the
difference between lawful intercourse and criminal intercourse (statutory
rape).9 Exposure to criminal liability for statutory rape, and the possibility
of punishment of up to twenty-years' imprisonment,"0 or even imprisonment
for life," is as significant and material as virtually any consequence imagin-
able.
Fraud, along with force and coercion, is one of the three principal
means by which a person can commit rape. 2 Obtaining intercourse through
fraud, just as through force and coercion, constitutes rape because it vitiates
the consent of the victim. 3  But the particular focus on consent differs. 14
7 Whether a particular fraud is material is one of a number of standards used to determine whether
obtaining intercourse by fraud constitutes rape by fraud. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 768 (noting
that the materiality of the fraud is among the variety of approaches that scholars have advanced); Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1182 (1986) (advocating that intercourse obtained by "deceptions of
material fact" should constitute rape). Although there are a wide variety of conceptions of materiality,
perhaps the most fundamental understanding is that a material fraud is a sufficiently significant fraud.
See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 777, 833 (1988) (contrasting material frauds with those frauds that "will be dismissed as insignifi-
cant"). A material fraud used to obtain intercourse will tend to be viewed as vitiating the consent of the
defrauded party and thereby constituting rape by fraud. See, e.g., State v. Vander Esch, 662 N.W.2d
689, 694 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) ("The victims had consented to one thing, and the defendant did some-
thing materially different."). For a further discussion of the materiality standard, see infra Part lI.A.2.c.
See infra notes 12-13. For a further discussion of rape by fraud, see infra Part I.
9 In referring to a statutory rape statute where liability is determined by whether the victim is below
a certain age and whether the age differential between the victim and perpetrator exceeds a specified
number of years, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that knowing the correct age of the victim is
material. See Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (N.M. 1990) ("[Where statutory rape liability] is deter-
mined not only by the child's age, but by the relative age of the defendant ... [and w]hen the law re-
quires a mathematical formula for its application, [one] cannot say that being provided the wrong
numbers is immaterial.").
10 E.g., Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 799 (Md. 1993) (noting that the maximum punishment for
statutory rape is twenty years' imprisonment); State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 769 (R.I. 1998) (explaining
that the minimum prison sentence for intercourse with a person fourteen years of age or younger is
twenty years); Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d at 821 n.42 (noting that the common understanding that inter-
course with a sixteen-year old may subject the perpetrator to incarceration for twenty years is reflected
in the saying, "'Sixteen will get you twenty!").
I See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 23 (West 2002) ("Whoever unlawfully has sexual inter-
course or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under sixteen years of age shall, for the first
offense, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years .... ).
12 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 301 (Official Code and Revised Comments, 1985)
("[R]ape has traditionally included not only intercourse by force or threat, but also sexual imposition on
an unconscious or otherwise incapacitated female, intimacy achieved by certain fundamental kinds of
deception, and intercourse with a mentally incompetent or underage female."); Joel Feinberg, Victims'
Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96 ETHICS 330, 333 (1986) (noting that "rape
can be committed by fraud as well as by violence or coercion").
13 See, e.g., People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427, 437 (1865) (upholding defendant's conviction for
rape by fraud and explaining that "[tihe outrage upon the woman.., is just as great in these cases as if
actual force had been employed; ... the act can[not] be ... any less against the will of the woman when
her consent is obtained by fraud, than when it is extorted by threats or force"); SISSELA BOK, LYING:
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Rape by physical force has generated the well-known position that the vic-
tim's affirmative denial of consent entails legally effective non-consent-
"no means no." 5 In contrast, rape by fraud triggers the issue of whether a
victim's fraudulently induced consent to intercourse is legally effective con-
sent. As Stephen Schulhofer predicts, "the next generation of issues [in
rape law] will center on when or whether 'yes' . . . mean[s] 'yes." 6
The two most prevalent types of rape by fraud transpire in the contexts
of medical treatment fraud and marital relations. 7 In the typical fraudulent
medical treatment case, a patient consents to penetration by a medical in-
strument (often for gynecological purposes), but instead receives sexual in-
tercourse. 8 In the typical spousal impersonation case, a spouse consents to
intercourse with someone whom s/he believes is his or her spouse (typically
the victim is in the dark and barely awake), but instead receives intercourse
with a non-spouse. 9 Although the specific rationales for each archetype of
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 18 (1978) (observing that deception, as well as force, can
be coercive); Chamallas, supra note 7, at 814 (noting the view that "consent is not considered freely
given if secured through physical force, economic pressure, or deception").
14 See, e.g., PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 188 (2004) ("Wrongful force and fraud ... both oper-
ate to undermine ... consent, but they do so in distinct ways."); Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Consent in the
Criminal Law, 8 HARV. L. REV. 317, 321 (1895) ("A seeming consent extorted by force or terror differs
from consent obtained by fraud. In the latter case the mind is deceived into agreement; in the former,
the body is forced to act without a real agreement of the mind.").
15 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY NO 102-
03 (1987) ("'Consent' should be defined so that no means no.... Reasonable men should be held to
know that no means no ... ").
16 Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 105, 135
(1990); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Some Ruminations on Women, Violence, and the Criminal Law, in
IN HARM'S WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL FEINBERG 209, 212 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen Buchanan
eds., 1994) (noting "the problem that 'yes' does not always mean 'yes').
17 See, e.g., Anne Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1998) ("The traditional ap-
proach... [finds rape] by fraud in only two narrow contexts. The first ... involves a man.., deceiving
the woman into thinking that she is submitting to a nonsexual act. The other tactic ... involves a man
who obtains intercourse by masquerading as the woman's husband."); Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud
and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 119 (1998) (identifying "the two archetypal rape by
fraud cases, fraudulent medical treatment and husband impersonation"); Ernst Wilfred Puttkammer,
Consent in Rape, 19 U. ILL. L. REV. 410, 422 n.45 (1925) (noting that spousal impersonation cases
"form the bulk of the fraud cases").
18 See, e.g., People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal. Rptr. 300, 304-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming rape
by fraud conviction of gynecologist who obtained intercourse with patient by fraudulently purporting to
effect penetration by medical instrument); People v. Quinlan, 596 N.E.2d 28, 31 (11. 1992) (affirming
sexual assault conviction of respiratory therapist who obtained digital penetration of patient by fraudu-
lently purporting to perform diagnostic test); Heidi Hurd, Was the Frog Prince Sexually Molested?: A
Review of Peter Westen's The Logic of Consent, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2005) (book review)
(noting that "a woman who acquiesces to penetration believing herself to be having a gynecological ex-
amination does not consent to sexual intercourse").
19 See, e.g., State v. Navarro, 367 P.2d 227, 230 (Ariz. 1961) (affirming defendant's conviction for
rape by fraud for obtaining intercourse by entering sleeping victim's bed at night and impersonating her
husband); Pinson v. State, 518 So. 2d 1220, 1224 (Miss. 1988) (same).
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rape by fraud may differ, the overarching rationale is that victims give con-
sent to some act, but instead receive something entirely different.2" They
consent to an act, but not the act.2'
This Article argues that obtaining intercourse by what we term "adult
impersonation"--falsely representing one's age as above the age of con-
sent-constitutes rape by fraud. The issue of adult impersonation as rape
by fraud has never before been raised.2 Nevertheless, adult impersonation
already qualifies as rape by fraud under the existing standards, tests, and ra-
tionales for rape-by-fraud liability.23 The victim of adult impersonation
consents to one act, but receives something entirely different.24  More spe-
cifically, the rationale for criminalizing adult impersonation closely com-
ports with the rationale for criminalizing spousal impersonation. In both,
victims consent to innocent and lawful intercourse, but instead receive
unlawful intercourse.25
Moreover, the justification for criminalizing spousal impersonation as
rape by fraud applies with greater force to adult impersonation. The nature
of the intercourse, in which the spousal impersonation victim is fraudulently
induced to engage, constitutes at most the comparatively minor criminal of-
20 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472, 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) ("Consent that act X may
be done is not consent that act Y be done."); State v. Vander Esch, 662 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa Ct. App.
2002) ("The victims had consented to one thing, and the defendant did something materially different.");
R v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23, 44 ("[C]onsent in such cases [of fraud used to obtain intercourse]
does not exist at all, because the act consented to is not the act done."); R v. Dee, [1884] 15 Cox CC
579, 587 (Ir. Cr. Cas. Res.) ("The act she [the victim] permitted cannot be properly regarded as the real
act which took place.").
21 See Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (11), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165, 167 (1996) ("[Iln
cases of false belief, there may be consent to an act, but there is no consent to the act."); Heidi Hurd,
The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 127 (1996) (noting similarly that "there may be
consent to an act, but there may be no consent to the act").
22 What has previously been raised is that a juvenile falsely representing being of the age of consent
constitutes fraud. Recently, two defendants unsuccessfully attempted to establish a defense to statutory
rape by characterizing as fraud the juvenile's misrepresentation of being of age. See State v. Blake, 777
A.2d 709, 711-12 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (referring to the juvenile's alleged false claim of being of age
as "fraudulent misrepresentation"); State v. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Wis. 2004) (arguing that
"he was not mistaken about the victim's age; he was defrauded by the victim"). But neither defendant
argued that the juvenile's fraudulent misrepresentation constituted rape by fraud.
Independently, in the fall of 2004, a first-year student at The University of Tulsa College of Law,
Ms. Christina Jenkins, raised the same issue by asking, "Isn't the juvenile committing fraud?" Ms. Jen-
kins' flash of insight sparked this Article. Once one views the juvenile's misrepresentation as fraud, it is
but a small conceptual leap to view the juvenile obtaining intercourse by this fraud as committing rape
by fraud.
23 See infra Part 11.
24 See supra notes 20-21.
25 See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
spousal impersonation to be rape by fraud ."since the woman's consent is to an innocent act of marital
intercourse while what is actually perpetrated on her is an act of adultery"' (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS
& RONALD M. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1081 (3d ed. 1982))); LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 767 (same);
Coughlin, supra note 17, at 32 (same).
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fenses of adultery and fornication.26 And with the repeal of adultery and
fornication statutes in many jurisdictions27 and the dramatic decrease in
their prosecution in the remaining jurisdictions,28 the victim of spousal im-
personation is perhaps not even committing a prosecutable criminal offense.
In contrast, the victim of adult impersonation is fraudulently induced into
engaging in intercourse constituting the much more serious offense of statu-
tory rape.29 As a result, if spousal impersonation constitutes rape by fraud
because the fraud renders the victim unaware of engaging in a borderline
criminal act, then a fortiori adult impersonation constitutes rape by fraud.
Adult impersonation renders the victim unaware of engaging not merely in
an antiquated, minor criminal offense, but rather in the serious criminal of-
fense of statutory rape.
There are a variety of possible reasons why the issue of adult imper-
sonation as rape by fraud has never arisen. First, our natural mindset per-
ceives a juvenile as the victim of rape, and that status as victim obscures our
view of the juvenile as a perpetrator of rape. But, of course, a juvenile may
commit and be held criminally liable for rape. 0 Second, we naturally as-
26 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 301 (Official Code and Revised Comments, 1985)
(noting that "fornication... has always been treated as a minor offense"); id. § 213.6 cmt. at 434 ("Me-
dian authorized maximum terms were six months for a single act of fornication ... and one and a half
years for adultery.").
27 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF THE LAW 157 (1998) ("Adultery is no longer a criminal offense in most states . J..."); Kay
L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1213 (2005) ("[C]ourts and legisla-
tures in recent years have dismantled criminal laws against consensual sodomy, fornication, and adul-
tery."). For a list of jurisdictions that prohibit neither adultery nor fornication in their recently revised
criminal codes, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. at 439 n.31. For a list of the jurisdictions that
continue, at least by statute, to criminalize adultery and fornication, see Carpenter, supra note 4, at 362
n.275; Coughlin, supra note 17, at 22 nn.78 & 80. For a list of the jurisdictions that continue, at least by
statute, to criminalize fornication, see Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 53 n.13 (Md. 1999).
28 See, e.g., Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 812 n.8 (Md. 1993) (Bell, J., dissenting) ("American
penal statutes against fornication are generally unenforced .... ); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. at
434 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985) ("American penal statutes against fornication and
adultery are generally unenforced."); RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 261 (1992) (observing that
existing statutes prohibiting adultery "are rarely enforced"). But cf Coughlin, supra note 17, at 23-26
(discussing that the assumed demise of adultery and fornication prosecutions is probably exaggerated).
29 In some jurisdictions, the punishment for statutory rape is up to twenty-years' imprisonment. See
supra note 10; see also DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 146 & n.17 (citing statutory rape as an example of a
strict liability offense resulting in "severe punishment").
30 See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3)(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (permitting
criminal court jurisdiction over juveniles thirteen years of age or older charged with any offense); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-26a (West 1987 & Supp. 2005) (requiring, on motion of the prosecutor, criminal
court jurisdiction over juveniles fourteen years of age or older charged with sexual assault); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (2003) (permitting criminal court jurisdiction over juveniles fourteen years of age or
older charged with any felony and requiring such jurisdiction over juveniles charged with rape, on mo-
tion of the prosecutor); see also MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 239-40 (2003)
("[M]ost jurisdictions authorize juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction over certain youthful offenders to
criminal court."). Samuel Davis explains that to hold a juvenile criminally liable, "[m]ost jurisdictions
require that the child be over a certain age and charged with a particularly serious offense .... "
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sume that if a juvenile is deemed legally incapable of consenting to inter-
course,3' then a juvenile should not be charged as a perpetrator of rape. But
a rape perpetrator's lack of consent is not a defense; similarly, a rape perpe-
trator's consent is not an element of the offense of rape.32 Thus, even if a
juvenile is deemed legally incapable of consenting to intercourse, a juvenile
still may be criminally liable for that intercourse.33 Third, since a juvenile's
misrepresentation as to age generally has been treated as irrelevant for pur-
poses of statutory rape liability,34 we naturally assume that it is irrelevant in
general. But its irrelevance for one type of rape (statutory rape) does not
preclude its relevance for another type of rape. Obtaining intercourse
through material and false representations is precisely what constitutes rape
by fraud.35
In addition to constituting a new category of rape by fraud, adult im-
personation may lay the foundation for a defense to the strict liability36 of-
fense of statutory rape. To understand this foundation, consider the
following examples of juveniles raping adults. If a juvenile rapes an adult
by a threat of physical force (for example, at gunpoint), should the adult be
prosecuted for statutory rape? If a juvenile rapes an adult by coercion (for
example, by threatening to falsely press criminal charges),37 should the adult
be prosecuted for statutory rape? If a juvenile rapes an adult by fraud (for
example, by impersonating the adult's spouse), should the adult be prose-
cuted for statutory rape? The answer in all three of these examples is, pre-
sumably, of course not-the adult victim of rape should not be criminally
liable for statutory rape. Similarly, if, as this Article argues, a juvenile ob-
taining intercourse by adult impersonation constitutes rape by fraud, then
the adult victim should not be criminally liable for statutory rape. Criminal
liability should not attach to one who becomes a perpetrator of statutory
SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 204 (2006). Some states
permit criminal court jurisdiction regardless of the offense charged, and others without regard to the age
of the juvenile. Id. at 206-07. And in some states, "statutes grant exclusive jurisdiction to criminal
courts in cases where minors are charged with designated offenses, generally serious felonies."
GARDNER, supra, at 196; see also infra notes 203-05.
31 See supra note 2; infra notes 202, 219-20.
32 See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
33 See infra Part II.D.2.
34 See supra notes 4-6; infra notes 246, 248.
35 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; infra Part I.
36 See supra note 3.
37 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(1) (West 2005) (prohibiting the use of coercion to obtain
intercourse); id. § 2C:14-10) (defining coercion as including threatening to "[a]ccuse anyone of an of-
fense," or "[elxpose any secret which would tend to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridi-
cule"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (prohibiting intercourse obtained
"[bly threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution");
id. § 3101 (defining "forcible compulsion" as "[clompulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral,
emotional, or psychological force"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (Official Code and Revised
Comments, 1985) (prohibiting intercourse where the actor "compels her [the victim] to submit by any
threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution"),
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rape because s/he became a victim of rape by fraud. In broader terms, one
should not be criminally liable as a perpetrator of statutory rape for the very
act of intercourse by which one is a victim of rape.
Until People v. Hernandez," in 1964, statutory rape was uniformly
treated as a strict liability offense, with respect to the age of the victim, in
all fifty states.39 Following Hernandez, over twenty states now recognize as
a defense some form of honest and reasonable mistake as to the age of the
victim.4" Strict liability remains the majority rule, however, which bars mis-
take of age, even when due to the victim's false representation, as a de-
fense.4
Being a victim of rape by fraud (via adult impersonation) is both a
stronger and narrower defense than that which convinced Hernandez and its
progeny to depart from strict liability for statutory rape. Not only is the vic-
tim of rape by fraud (i) honestly and reasonably mistaken as to the age of
the juvenile, and (ii) the mistake is due to the juvenile's false representa-
tion, but also (iii) the juvenile's false representation rises to the level of
criminal fraud, and (iv) the criminal fraud is sufficiently serious to warrant
condemnation as the crime of rape. Satisfaction of these additional ele-
ments will have the effect of restricting the defense to an appreciably nar-
rower class of defendants. In this way, what seems to effect a radical
transformation of statutory rape law is actually a more modest and limited
defense than that recognized since 1964 and now accepted in over twenty
jurisdictions. And unlike the mistake-of-age defense, this new defense is
applicable even under a strict liability conception of statutory rape.42 While
strict liability imposes on the adult the assumption of risk of an underage
sexual partner, it cannot impose on the adult the assumption of risk of being
raped. As a result, even jurisdictions disallowing the mistake-of-age de-
fense would have compelling reasons to adopt this defense.
After Part I provides an overview of the law of rape by fraud, Part II
demonstrates that obtaining intercourse by adult impersonation constitutes
rape by fraud under statutory standards, caselaw rationales, and suggested
approaches advanced by rape scholars. Adult impersonation is applied to
38 393 P.2d 673, 678 (Cal. 1964) (reversing defendant's conviction for statutory rape and allowing a
defense based on the defendant's honest and reasonable mistake as to the victim's age).
39 See, e.g., State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 763 (R.I. 1998) ("Characterizing statutory-rape as a
strict-liability offense remained the law in every American jurisdiction until 1964."); State v. Jadowski,
680 N.W.2d 810, 822 n.49 (Wis. 2004) (noting that Hernandez was "apparently the first case to allow
the defense [to statutory rape based on mistake of age]").
40 See, e.g., Yanez, 716 A.2d at 784 (Flanders, J., dissenting) ("[T]wenty-three American jurisdic-
tions, nearly half, now explicitly recognize some form of the mistake-of-age defense."); Garnett v. State,
632 A.2d 797, 802-03 (Md. 1993) (noting that twenty-one jurisdictions have some form of mistake-of-
age defense to statutory rape).
41 See supra notes 4-6.
42 Strict liability only precludes defenses negating mens rea; other defenses are applicable. See su-
pra note 3.
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four general standards of fraud, the rationales of two context-specific types
of fraud-identity fraud and spousal impersonation-and two conceptions
of consent. In many jurisdictions and under most approaches, adult imper-
sonation will qualify more clearly as rape than existing, accepted types of
rape by fraud. After anticipating and answering five possible objections,
Part II concludes that adult impersonation qualifies as rape by fraud, under
existing statutes and caselaw, in over thirty jurisdictions.
Part III explores the significance of our analysis of adult impersonation
for the law of statutory rape. After furnishing a brief overview of the law of
statutory rape, Part III reveals how adult impersonation constituting rape by
fraud may lay the foundation for a new defense to the strict liability offense
of statutory rape. This new defense is shown to be both stronger and nar-
rower than the defense already accepted in a substantial minority of juris-
dictions. The viability of this new defense is further assessed by raising and
rebutting four possible objections. This Article concludes that adult imper-
sonation supplies both a new form of the offense of rape by fraud and a new
defense to statutory rape.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF RAPE BY FRAUD
The traditional organizing principle for classifying what types of fraud
vitiate consent, and thus constitute rape, and what types of fraud do not, is
the distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement.43
Fraud in the factum consists of a deception or fraud as to the fact, or act, or
nature of the act, itself. Fraud in the inducement consists of a deception or
fraud neither to the fact, nor act, nor nature of the act, nor "to the thing
done, but [rather] ... to some collateral matter."" Martha Chamallas pro-
vides the following concise account of the distinction:
[In firaud in the factum... the victim consents to the doing of act X and the
perpetrator of the fraud, in the guise of doing act X, actually does act Y.
[In] ... fraud in the inducement ... the victim is fraudulently induced to con-
sent to the doing of act X and the perpetrator of the fraud does indeed commit
act X. 4
5
43 See, e.g., Falk, supra note 17, at 157 ("The traditional formula for distinguishing legally valid
from invalid consent in fraud cases is the dichotomy between fraud in the factum and fraud in the in-
ducement."); Murphy, supra note 16, at 212 (same); People v. Harris, 155 Cal. Rptr. 472, 478 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) ("On the issue of consent, from an analytic standpoint, there are two kinds of fraud: fraud in
the fact and fraud in the inducement.").
44 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 25, at 215.
45 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 831 n.224. For a largely identical account of the distinction, see Har-
ris, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 478. For other accounts, see, for example, DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT
49-50 (1998) ("[T]o be deceived in the factum is to be completely misled about an important, indeed
probably crucial, aspect of the act. To be deceived in the inducement is to be less than completely mis-
led about the act."); WESTEN, supra note 14, at 198 ("To deceive a subject S about the act itsetf... con-
stitutes 'fraud in the factum.' Yet deceptions that ... mislead her about the benefits of engaging in it
constitute 'fraud in the inducement."'); Feinberg, supra note 12, at 332 (explaining the distinction as
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Construed most narrowly, if, as a result of the fraud, the victim is unaware
of engaging in sexual intercourse, the fraud is classified as fraud in the fac-
turn.' If the victim is aware of engaging in sexual intercourse, but has been
induced to do so for a fraudulent reason, the fraud is classified as fraud in
the inducement.47 Typically, obtaining intercourse by fraud in the factum
vitiates consent and thus results in rape liability; fraud in the inducement
does neither. 8
Two variations on the fraudulent medical treatment archetype aptly il-
lustrate the distinction. Suppose a doctor obtains sexual intercourse with a
patient by fraudulently representing that penetration will serve a medical
purpose. In one variation, where the victim is unaware of the intercourse
(perhaps believing penetration to be by a medical instrument), the fraud is
in the factum.49 In the other, where the victim is aware of the intercourse
(believing the intercourse itself to be of medical benefit), the fraud is in the
inducement." Courts have traditionally found only the first type of fraud-
fraud in the factum-to support rape liability."
"rcst[ing] on an apparent contrast between no consent at all to what is done by the deceiver (fraud in the
factum) and consent that is less than voluntary because of defective belief induced by deception (fraud in
the inducement)").
46 See Puttkammer, supra note 17, at 423 ("If there is any use in speaking of the fundamental dis-
tinctions the line would seem most naturally to be drawn between knowledge that it is a sexual act and
absence of such knowledge .... ),
47 See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
since the victim was aware of the act to which consent was given-sexual intercourse-the defendant's
fraud was merely fraud in the inducement which did not vitiate the victim's consent and the defendant
could not be prosecuted for rape); DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585 (explaining that where "the victim
knew that she was consenting to sexual intercourse; the fraud was in the inducement"); LAFAVE, supra
note 6, at 767 (same).
48 See, e.g., People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal. Rptr. 300, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that gener-
ally fraud in the factum vitiates consent but fraud in the inducement does not); People v. Cicero, 204
Cal. Rptr. 582, 596-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (same); WESTEN, supra note 14, at 195 (same); Feinberg,
supra note 12, at 333 ("For sexual relations induced by fraud in thefactum the perpetrator will be held
criminally liable for rape ... whereas if the fraud is merely in the inducement, he may not be criminally
liable at all .... "); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 25, at 215 (same).
49 See, e.g., supra notes 18 and 20.
so See, e.g., Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26 (finding fraud in the inducement, and thus no rape liabil-
ity, because the victim was aware of the act-intercourse-where defendant fraudulently induced victim
to believe intercourse was necessary to cure a fatal disease and thus save her life); Moran v. People, 25
Mich. 356, 363-64 (1872) (reversing defendant's rape conviction where the victim was aware of the
act-intercourse-but believed, due to defendant's fraudulent representations, that it was necessary
medical treatment).
51 Stephen Schulhofer supplies the following account of the two variations:
If a doctor tells a patient he needs to insert a medical instrument into her vagina, and then inserts
his penis instead, the law treats his conduct as rape. But if the doctor falsely tells his patient that
she needs to have intercourse with him in order to improve her health, his conduct is not consid-
ered a crime.
SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 152; see also DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585 (same); Falk, supra note
17, at 158 (same).
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Perhaps the most difficult application of the distinction is to cases of
spousal impersonation. 2 Some older cases have found spousal impersona-
tion to be fraud in the inducement, and therefore not rape by fraud, because
the victim is aware of the act of intercourse. 3 "[O]ther courts, with better
reason," conclude that spousal impersonation is fraud in the factum (and
therefore rape by fraud) because the victim is unaware of the nature of the
act. 4 The nature of the act to which the victim consented was marital inter-
course, but instead s/he received adulterous intercourse.5 S/he gave con-
sent to one thing, but received something entirely different-an act of a
different nature. 6
The spousal impersonation scenario exemplifies the ambiguity and ar-
bitrariness57 of the factum-inducement distinction. 8 Spousal impersonation
is or is not fraud in the factum depending on how the act or nature of the act
is construed. How do we determine whether a victim is defrauded as to an
integral part of the act or merely to a collateral matter? What exactly is the
act or the nature of the act? Depending on the application of a thick or thin
description of the act or the nature of the act, a given type of fraud may or
may not make the victim unaware of the act or the nature of the act. 9 The
52 See, eg., DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585 ("Courts have struggled with the question of [spousal
impersonation]."); LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 767 (noting that spousal impersonation "has proved diffi-
cult to classify"); Feinberg, supra note 12, at 334 (describing spousal impersonation as an "intermediate
sort of case in which the fraud is harder to classify"). For a brief discussion of spousal impersonation,
see supra note 19 and accompanying text; for a more expansive discussion, see infra Part I1.B.2.
53 See, e.g., People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (stating, in dicta, that
with "the nature of the act being understood, it is not rape ... even if a woman has intercourse with a
man impersonating her husband"); R v. Barrow, (1868) 1 L.R.C.C.R. 156, 158 (reversing defendant's
rape conviction for obtaining intercourse by spousal impersonation on the basis that the victim was
awake and aware of engaging in intercourse).
54 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 25, at 1080.
55 See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (stating, in dicta,
that spousal impersonation is fraud in the factum and therefore rape); LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 767 (not-
ing that spousal impersonation has been found to be fraud in the factum because the victim "perceived
the situation as one of lawful intercourse with her husband rather than adultery"); PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 25, at 1080-81 (explaining that spousal impersonation is fraud in the factum (and therefore
rape) because the victim's "consent is to an innocent act of marital intercourse while what is actually
perpetrated upon her is an act of adultery").
56 See, e.g., R v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23, 44 ("Consent to [sexual intercourse] with a hus-
band is not consent to adultery."); R v. Dee, [1884] 15 Cox CC 579, 594 (Ir. Cr. Cas. Res.) ("The person
by whom the act was to be performed was part of its essence. The consent of the intellect, the only con-
sent known to the law, was to the act of the husband only .... ); see also supra notes 20-21.
57 See, e.g., WESTEN, supra note 14, at 198 (terming the distinction "ambiguous"); Feinberg, supra
note 12, at 333 n.7 (explaining "the essential arbitrariness" of the distinction). For further criticism of
the distinction, see infra notes 64-65.
58 See, e.g., WESTEN, supra note 14, at 198-99 (illustrating the elasticity of the distinction by its ap-
plication to cases of spousal impersonation).
59 See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 206 (2003) ("Everything turns
on the way in which a case is described, and there is no reason to think that the intercourse/non-
intercourse distinction is the only plausible factual basis on which to distinguish one case from an-
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thicker the description of the act or the nature of the act-that is, the more
features, circumstances, and aspects that constitute the act or the nature of
the act beyond sexual intercourse itself-the more likely a given type of
fraud will be construed as fraud in the factum.6 ° Regarding spousal imper-
sonation, if the act is defined as including the victim's non-spousal relation-
ship to the impersonator, then the fraud is in the factum.6 The thinner the
description of the act or nature of the act-for example, sexual intercourse
per se-the more likely a given type of fraud will be construed as fraud in
the inducement. If the act is defined to be merely intercourse, thereby ex-
cluding the victim's non-spousal relationship with the impersonator, then
spousal impersonation is fraud in the inducement.62 Courts and commenta-
tors regard the marital versus adulterous (and thus lawful versus criminal)
status of the intercourse as an integral part of the act or nature of the act and
therefore categorize spousal impersonation as fraud in the factum. 63
Because of the malleability' and arbitrariness of what constitutes the
act or nature of the act versus what constitutes merely a collateral matter,
the factum-inducement distinction is heavily criticized6 5 and its influence is
"eroding."66  Some jurisdictions have expressly abolished the distinction
other."); Feinberg, supra note 12, at 345 (concluding that, after examining several cases as to their
proper classification as fraud in the factum or inducement, the "issue reduces to that of deciding on rele-
vant act-descriptions for the conduct consented to, and the conduct that actually took place").
60 For example, with respect to spousal impersonation, "[i]f the identity of the person doing the act
is part of the essence [of the act], then a mistake regarding his identity is an essential mistake."
Puttkammer, supra note 17, at 423. That is, if the identity of the person is part of the act to which the
victim consented, then a victim of spousal impersonation was defrauded as to the act itself, which is
fraud in the factum and, therefore, rape.
61 WESTEN, supra note 14, at 199.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Crosswell v. People, 13 Mich. 427, 437 (1865) (commenting that cases upholding con-
victions of rape by fraud for spousal impersonation "seem to us to stand upon the much better reasons,
and to be more in accordance with the general rules of criminal law"); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
25, at 215-16 (same). For authorities viewing spousal impersonation as fraud in the factum, see infra
notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., WESTEN, supra note 14, at 198 ("The interchangeability of [various standards of fraud
in the factum] . .. enables courts and commentators to conceptualize any fraud that they regard as suffi-
cient to invalidate acquiescence as a fraud in the factum."); Joan McGregor, Why When She Says No She
Doesn't Mean Maybe and Doesn't Mean Yes, 2 LEGAL THEORY 185, 200-01 (1996) (same).
65 See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 197 ("1 do not find this distinction particularly help-
ful."); Falk, supra note 17, at 69, 159 (referring to the distinction's "problematic elasticity" and explain-
ing how the distinction is "objectionable on several grounds"); Murphy, supra note 16, at 212
(questioning whether it is "a morally coherent distinction"); id. at 221 (suggesting, at least as applied to
some cases, that it is "absurd"); Puttkammer, supra note 17, at 423 ("[T]here is little profit... in speak-
ing of 'fundamental differences' as contrasted with 'merely collateral circumstances'; the dividing line
may too easily be drawn where the speaker wishes and the arbitrary nature of his choice be covered by
such terms of mere camouflage.").
66 RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 294 (2d ed. 2004); see Falk, supra note 17, at 171
(chronicling the trend among legislators and commentators away from "adherence to a formalistic dis-
tinction" and toward "a more thorough examination of the basis of victim consent").
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and purport to criminalize all types of fraud used to obtain intercourse.67
Other jurisdictions invoke the distinction but construe fraud in the factum
quite broadly, employing a variety of tests.68 As Peter Westen explains,
"[t]o avoid reaching normatively untenable results, courts and commenta-
tors tend implicitly to adopt a broad standard" of fraud in the factum. 69
Many jurisdictions prohibit specific categories of fraud-identity fraud,7°
spousal impersonation,7 and fraudulent medical treatment 7 -without refer-
ence to the distinction. And still other jurisdictions ignore the distinction
and instead consider the effect of the fraud in relation to some other aspect
or standard governing rape law, such as whether the victim consented.73
In addition to the factum-inducement distinction, criminal liability for
adultery and fornication has influenced the development of the law of rape
by fraud. As Anne Coughlin explains, the emergence of rape-by-fraud li-
ability dovetailed with the need to supply defenses for those charged with
the criminal offenses of adultery and fornication.74 To such charges, a mar-
ried woman who acquiesced to non-marital intercourse nonetheless could
67 See, e.g., State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846, 849 n.2 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming defendant's
third-degree rape conviction and stating, in dicta, that "[a]lthough this distinction [between fraud in the
factum and fraud in the inducement] is recognized in many jurisdictions, Hawaii is not one of them");
see also LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 768-69 (citing both Tennessee and Hawaii as jurisdictions that have
abolished the distinction). For a discussion of ten other jurisdictions in which the distinction may have
been abolished, see infra Part II.C. 1.
68 See, e.g., People v. Chang, No. D042603, 2004 WL 2058377, at *5 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
2004) (approving the trial court's jury instruction "that fraud in fact is a false representation of 'the es-
sential characteristics of the act.' (quoting CALJIC No. 10.33 (2004))); People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 300, 303-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding fraud in the factum despite victim being aware of the
intercourse because victim was unaware of the nature of the act). For a discussion of three of these tests,
see infra Part ll.A.2.a-c.
69 WESTEN, supra note 14, at 198.
70 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (1995) (providing that the victim's consent to inter-
course is absent where intercourse is obtained "through deception as to the identity of the actor"). For a
discussion of identity fraud as rape by fraud and whether adult impersonation constitutes identity fraud,
see infra Part I.B.1.
71 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-402(l)(c) (2004) (defining rape by fraud as including obtain-
ing intercourse with the victim where the "actor knows that the victim submits erroneously, believing
the actor to be the victim's spouse"). For other jurisdictions finding spousal impersonation to be rape by
fraud without reference to the factum-inducement distinction, see infra notes 164-65.
72 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (Supp. 2004) (criminalizing "sexual intercourse with
a victim when the victim's consent was obtained through a knowing misrepresentation made by the of-
fender that the sexual intercourse was a medically or therapeutically necessary procedure"); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.05(3)(h) (McKinney 2004) ("[T]he act of sexual conduct occurs during a treatment session,
consultation, interview, or examination."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(4) (2002) ("The accused engages
in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or
stimulation.").
73 For a discussion of two conceptions of consent, and how fraud affects the victim's consent, see
infra Part II.C. 1-2.
74 See Coughlin, supra note 17, at 30 ("[T]he traditional elements of rape begin to mimic perfectly
the substantive arguments that we would expect a woman to make if she were trying to defend herself
against an accusation of fornication or adultery.").
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gain an acquittal by persuasively claiming that either she was unaware of
the intercourse itself or she was unaware that the intercourse was not with
her husband.75 An unmarried woman who acquiesced to intercourse, and
was charged with fornication, only could invoke the defense that she was
unaware that she was engaging in intercourse.76
A number of factors have led modem rape law to more widely recog-
nize intercourse obtained by fraud as rape." First, due to the sweeping
reconceptualization of rape as a violation of one's sexual autonomy rather
than a crime of violence, consent (which fraud vitiates) has increasingly
supplanted the element of force as the focal point of rape law.78 Second,
Susan Estrich has influentially called for the same standard of fraud that
applies in criminalizing financial transactions to also apply in rape law.79
Third, a consensus has emerged among commentators for broadening the
scope of rape-by-fraud liability.8" Last, and perhaps most importantly, the
75 See id. at 32 ("[A] mistake of fact argument might prevail where the woman believed that the sex
act constituted marital (i.e., lawful) intercourse because she believed that she was having sex with her
husband, when in fact the paramour was someone else.").
76 See id. ("[W]here the woman showed that she reasonably believed that her conduct was nonsex-
ual, such as participating in a routine medical procedure, but the man had used the procedure as a subter-
fuge to perpetrate sexual intercourse[, the woman would have a defense to a charge of fornication].").
77 See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
78 See, e.g., People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he law of rape pri-
marily guards the integrity of a woman's will and the privacy of her sexuality from an act of intercourse
undertaken without her consent. . . . '[Florce' plays merely a supporting evidentiary role."); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 301 (Official Code and Revised Comments, 1985) ("The law of rape pro-
tects the female's freedom of choice and punishes unwanted and coerced intimacy."); ESTRICH, supra
note 15, at 29 ("[N]onconsent has long been viewed as the key element in the definition of rape."); Lucy
Reed Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 644
(1976) (remarking that "the role of fraud in rape law demonstrates that freedom of sexual choice rather
than physical protection is the primary value served by criminalization of rape").
79 ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 102-03 ("The 'force' or 'coercion' that negates consent ought to be
defined to include ... misrepresentations of material fact .... [T]he threshold of liability ... should be
understood to include at least those nontraditional rapes where the woman ... submits only in response
to lies or threats which would be prohibited were money sought instead [of intercourse]."). For a meas-
ure of the influence of Estrich's view, see SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 155 ("Many therefore share
Susan Estrich's view that a lie used to induce sexual consent should be punished as a serious criminal
offense, under the same standards that apply to fraud used to obtain money."); Donald Dripps, Beyond
Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1783 (1992) (referring to Estrich as penning "the leading treatment of rape to is-
sue from the American legal academy"); Falk, supra note 17, at 45 ("[Estrich's] suggestion spawned the
latest cycle of discussion about this age-old conundrum in the American legal academic community.").
For a critique of Estrich's recommendations, see Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, 7 CRIM. JUST.
ETHIcs 69, 76-77 (1988) (book review) (finding Estrich's approach too broad because it criminalizes
trivial forms of fraud-for example, obtaining intercourse by the false representation of"'I love you"--
as rape).
80 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585 (suggesting that the criminalization of spousal imper-
sonation as rape should be broadened to impersonation in general); SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 159
(advocating that some instances of fraud typically found to be fraud in the inducement and traditionally
excluded from being rape, should constitute rape); Feinberg, supra note 12, at 335, 341 (suggesting that
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factum-inducement distinction is increasingly viewed as arbitrary and its
influence is waning."
Although the scope of rape-by-fraud liability has broadened somewhat,
the criminal law persists in refusing to recognize some types of fraud used
to obtain intercourse-paradigmatic instances of fraud in the inducement-
as rape.82 Fraud as to the degree of the perpetrator's affection for, or roman-
tic commitment to, the victim is commonly not treated as rape. 3 Obtaining
intercourse by false representations of "I love you," "I'll respect you in the
morning," or "I only want to be with you," is dismissed as endemic to the
illusions that courtship and romance often foster and as insufficiently seri-
ous to be deemed rape. 4 As one author notes, "What is being in love, in
fact, if not harboring certain illusions about love, about oneself, and about
the person with whom one is in love?" 5 A Canadian Supreme Court Justice
likewise opined that such deceptions "have from time immemorial been the
by-product of romance and sexual encounters.... Thus far in the history of
civilization, these deceptions, however sad, have been left to the domain of
song, verse, and social censure [but not the protection of the criminal
law]." 6 Similarly, fraud as to one's societal status, wealth, or physical ap-
peal is generally not treated as rape. 7 Obtaining intercourse by wearing
some fraud in the inducement cases should be rape if the fraud is harmful or substantially reduces the
voluntariness of the consent of the victim); Murphy, supra note 16, at 222 (some fraud in the induce-
ment should be rape). For commentators agreeing with Estrich's call for an expansion of the type of
frauds that suffice for rape based on the type of frauds that suffice for theft, see, for example,
WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 213-14; Falk, supra note 17, at 180; Jane E. Larson, Women Under-
stand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit,' 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374, 438-53 (1993); Robin
West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1450 (1993). For a
brief survey of suggestions to expand the scope of rape by fraud liability, see LAFAVE, supra note 6, at
768; Falk, supra note 17, at 162-69.
81 See supra note 65.
82 See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 7, at 832 ("False promises of marriage, false representations of
sterility, or false professions of love will not vitiate the deceived party's consent."); Murphy, supra note
16, at 222 (considering the example of obtaining intercourse by the false promise of a gift of a mink
coat, Murphy observes that neither commentators nor legislators treat this as rape).
83 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 154 ("A prosecution for a minor misrepresentation ('I
love the color of your eyes') would be absurd.").
84 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 25 M.J. 114, 116 (C.M.A. 1987) ("Clearly, fraud in the in-
ducement includes such general knavery as: 'No, I'm not married'; 'Of course I'll respect you in the
morning'; 'We'll get married as soon as .... . Whatever else such tactics amount to, they are not
rape."); SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 155 (suggesting that the difficulty of ascertaining whether such
misrepresentations "('I love you'; 'I want to spend my life with you') were false and whether the person
making them knew at the time that they were false" may explain the law's refusal to condemn them as
rape).
85 WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 198 (quoting ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON
THE GREAT VIRTUES 241 (Catherine Temerson trans., 2001)).
86 R v. Cuerrier, [1998] 162 D.L.R.4th 513, 537 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., concurring).
87 Vivian Berger expresses the prevailing view as to why such fraud does not suffice for rape:
I must confess to minimal sympathy for the idea that the law should protect, via criminal sanc-
tions, the cheated expectations of women who sought to sleep their way to the top but discovered,
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"alluring make-up or a false moustache,"8 or by false representations that
one drives a Ferrari or owns a mansion on the French Riviera is deemed,
like misleading advertising, as seller's puffery and too trivial to be classi-
fied as rape. 9 As a New York court put it, "[i]t is not criminal conduct for a
male ... to assure any trusting female that, as in the ancient fairy tale, the
ugly frog is really the handsome prince. '" For these types of misrepresen-
tations, it seems the criminal law's posture is that all's fair in love and
war.9' "Caveat amator!
92
While a wide variety of false representations used to obtain intercourse
have been litigated,93 curiously one type of fraud that arises with surprising
frequency94 has apparently never been claimed to qualify as rape by fraud.
too late, that they were dealing with swindlers.... [T]he notion that rape, one of the gravest possi-
ble infringements of human integrity, should be expanded to include situations where the woman
attempts to sell her body and fails to receive the bargained-for price simply makes a mockery of
women's long efforts to achieve autonomy, respect, and equality.
Berger, supra note 79, at 76.
88 Cuerrier, 162 D.L.R.4th at 540 (McLachlin, J., concurring).
89 Jeffrie Murphy explains that the criminal law's reluctance to treat such cases as rape is based on
the nature of the fraudulent inducement revealing that the "victim does not value sexuality in the way
characteristic of the norms we seek to protect." Murphy, supra note 16, at 222 (emphasis omitted).
That is, a victim who would barter away his or her sexuality for a gain in wealth or status does not de-
serve the criminal law's protection.
90 People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 922 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
91 Richard Posner defends the criminal law's refusal to criminalize such arguably innocuous misrep-
resentations by contrasting them with spousal impersonation and misrepresentations in the medical con-
text:
Seduction, even when honeycombed with lies that would convict the man of fraud if he were
merely trying to obtain money, is not rape. The thinking may be that if the woman is not averse to
having sex with a particular man, the wrong if any is in the lies (and we usually do not think of ly-
ing in social settings as a crime) rather than in an invasion of her bodily integrity. It is otherwise if
the man is impersonating the woman's husband or claims to be administering medical treatment to
the woman rather than to be inserting his penis in her. In both cases the act itself, were the true
facts known to the woman, would be disgusting as well as humiliating, rather than merely humili-
ating as in the case of the common misrepresentations of dating and courtship.
POSNER, supra note 28, at 392-93.
92 WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 197 (implicitly comparing the maxim, caveat emptor, or let the
buyer beware, with the maxim, caveat amator, or let the lover beware).
93 See, e.g., Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 433 (Ct. App. 1983) (reversing dismissal of
tort action for battery based on plaintiff's pregnancy resulting from defendant's false representation of
sterility); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 876-77 (Idaho 1994) (ruling that a wife's battery claim against her
husband for obtaining intercourse with her by his false representation of sexual fidelity was actionable
because his fraud vitiated her consent); Cuerrier, 162 D.L.R.4th at 567 (ruling that defendant who
fraudulently obtained intercourse by failing to disclose that he was HIV-positive could be prosecuted for
aggravated assault because the fraud vitiated the consent of the victim); Falk, supra note 17, at 179-80
(noting "the gradual proliferation of archetypical fraudulent treatment cases occurring in ever-
broadening professional circumstances and husband impersonation scenarios spilling over into assorted
non-marital contexts, as well as the steady accumulation of fraudulent... sex cases more closely resem-
bling commercial-like fraud, property-like offenses, and authoritative abuse").
94 For cases in which the statutory rape victim was found to have falsely represented being above
the age of consent, see infra note 248. Of course, presumably most statutory rape victims do not misrep-
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At first blush, adult impersonation might seem to fall under the rubric of
"all's fair in love and war" and not constitute a serious enough form of
fraud to be rape. But adult impersonation exposes the victim to very seri-
ous consequences--criminal liability for statutory rape which may be pun-
ished by twenty years of incarceration.95 This fraud does not engender,
under any standard, consequences too trivial to be rape by fraud.
II. ADULT IMPERSONATION CONSTITUTING RAPE BY FRAUD
This Part presents a typology of standards, tests, and rationales that
various jurisdictions use to determine whether obtaining intercourse by
fraud will be criminalized as rape.96 These divide into three principal
groupings: (i) general standards of fraud, (ii) context-specific types of
fraud, and (iii) conceptions of consent (that may be vitiated by fraud). Each
of the various standards is then applied to our scenario of adult impersona-
tion. The scenario assumes the following: (i) the juvenile reasonably ap-
pears to be, and affirmatively misrepresents his or her age as being, above
the age of consent, and (ii) in reliance on the misrepresentation, the adult
engages in intercourse with the juvenile under the honest and reasonable be-
lief that the juvenile is above the age of consent.97 Although each jurisdic-
tion imposes its own requirements for rape-by-fraud liability, an instance of
adult impersonation not satisfying one of the above conditions might well
not qualify as rape by fraud. After anticipating and answering possible ob-
jections, this Part concludes that obtaining intercourse by adult impersona-
tion constitutes rape by fraud under existing standards in over thirty
jurisdictions.
Even apart from satisfying specific, existing legal standards, adult im-
personation satisfies perhaps the most fundamental basis for rape-by-fraud
liability-serious harm befalling the defrauded victim. This prospect of se-
vere criminal punishment for the defrauded victim, unique to adult imper-
sonation among types of fraud, makes hollow the oft-voiced concern of
line-drawing difficulties in recognizing new forms of rape by fraud. As a
resent their age. And even where there is credible evidence of a misrepresentation of age, not all statu-
tory rape defendants engage in intercourse in reliance on that misrepresentation.
95 See supra note 10.
96 Not all jurisdictions designate fraudulently obtaining sexual intercourse, contact, or conduct, as
rape by fraud. Some jurisdictions criminalize this conduct under various terms including, for example,
"sexual assault," see infra note 111 and accompanying text, "sexual misconduct," see infra note 98 and
accompanying text, and "sexual battery," see infra note 178. For simplicity's sake, this Article uses the
term rape by fraud to encompass all such offenses involving sexual intercourse, contact, or conduct ob-
tained by fraud.
97 The scenario also assumes that the juvenile, though below the age of consent, is above the age at
which juveniles may be prosecuted as adults and held criminally liable for their crimes. The typical age
of consent is sixteen, but may be as old as eighteen. See supra note 2. The typical age at which one
may be prosecuted as an adult and held criminally liable for crimes committed is above the age of thir-
teen. See supra note 30. Thus, this scenario assumes a juvenile that typically will be fourteen or fifteen
years of age but may be as old as seventeen.
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result, adult impersonation more convincingly qualifies as rape by fraud
than currently accepted forms of rape by fraud.
A. General Standards of Fraud
This section explains various jurisdictions' general standards of fraud
sufficient for rape liability and applies these standards to adult impersona-
tion. Some jurisdictions refrain from imposing any apparent limitation on
the type of fraud that will suffice for rape liability. Other jurisdictions limit
liability to situations where the fraud renders the victim unaware of (i) the
nature of the act of intercourse, (ii) the essential characteristics or funda-
mental aspects of the act, or (iii) a material fact.
1. Fraud without Limitation.-Numerous jurisdictions criminalize
obtaining intercourse by any fraud. For example, under an Alabama statute,
intercourse "where consent was obtained by the use of any fraud or artifice"
constitutes the crime of sexual misconduct.98 Hawaii, Tennessee, and Vir-
ginia prohibit intercourse "induced by deception,.99 "accomplished by
fraud,"'" and obtained by "ruse,"'' respectively. These prohibitions place
no limitation on the requisite type of fraud. For example, Tennessee de-
fines fraud "as used in normal parlance and includes, but is not limited to,
deceit, trickery, misrepresentation and subterfuge, and shall be broadly con-
strued."'0 2  Three jurisdictions-Michigan, Rhode Island, and Utah-have
largely identical statutes criminalizing intercourse obtained by "conceal-
ment.""1 3 Even in the absence of express statutory language, Nevada's Su-
preme Court ruled, in McNair v. State, that the language of Nevada's sexual
assault statute "is sufficiently broad and explicit to encompass conduct...
occurring as a result of fraud and deceit."'"
Hawaii and Tennessee seemingly have removed all of the historically
recognized limitations on fraud by abolishing the fraud in the factum-fraud
98 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added).
99 HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235 (1993).
100 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) (2003 & Supp. 2005).
101 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4A(i) (2004).
102 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(13) (2003).
103 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(l)(f)(v) (West 2004) (criminalizing, as first degree
criminal sexual conduct, intercourse "[w]hen the actor, through concealment or by the element of sur-
prise, is able to overcome the victim"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(3) (2002) (similar); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-406(3) (2003) (similar). For a case construing the term "concealment" as encompassing fraud,
see People v. Crippen, 617 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that "the evidence that
defendant disguised himself, and took advantage of the complainant's misidentification of him as her
fiancd to induce her to submit to his sexual advances, was sufficient to establish the requisite coercion
by concealment").
104 825 P.2d 571, 574 (Nev. 1992) ("[W]hen a physician succeeds in the penile penetration of a pa-
tient under the guise of performing a medical examination, a sexual assault is committed by fraud and
deceit without the victim's consent.").
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in the inducement distinction." 5 In State v. Oshiro, a Hawaiian court ob-
served that "[a]lthough this distinction is recognized in many jurisdictions,
Hawaii is not one of them."' 6 A Tennessee court's comment also suggests
that, in effect, the distinction has been abolished: "[W]ith respect to the of-
fense of rape the legislature has provided that fraud in either the act of sex-
ual penetration or in the inducement of the sexual act so vitiates the victim's
consent that the act of sexual penetration is considered non-consensual."' 17
Obtaining intercourse by adult impersonation convincingly qualifies as
rape by fraud in the above jurisdictions. By placing no express limitation
on the requisite fraud, each of these jurisdictions adopts a broad view of the
fraud sufficing for rape by fraud. Even if we might suspect that the stan-
dard of fraud is not quite as broad as these jurisdictions represent, adult im-
personation is sufficiently serious 10 to constitute rape by fraud in these
eight jurisdictions.
2. Limitations on Fraud-The following standards limit the types of
fraud that suffice for rape by fraud. They delineate various conceptions of
the aspects of the act, beyond sexual intercourse itself. These compara-
tively thicker or broader descriptions of the act0 9 encompass situations
where the victim is aware that s/he is engaging in sexual intercourse but is
unaware of some aspect or circumstance of the act sufficiently significant to
be deemed an integral part of, or constitutive of, the act itself or thing done.
Adult impersonation satisfies these standards by rendering the victim un-
aware of the act's criminality.
a. Nature of the act.--Obtaining intercourse by a fraud that ren-
ders the victim unaware of the nature of the act"0 constitutes rape by fraud.
For example, Arizona criminalizes nonconsensual intercourse as the offense
of sexual assault."' Nonconsensual intercourse includes where "[t]he vic-
tim is intentionally deceived as to the nature of the act.""' 2 In addition,
105 See LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 768-69 (citing both Tennessee and Hawaii as jurisdictions that
have abolished the distinction). For a discussion of ten other jurisdictions in which the distinction may
have been abolished, see infra Part II.C. 1.
106 696 P.2d 846, 849 n.2 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
107 State v. Batts, No. M2001-00896-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31039378, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Jan. 27, 2003) (citing State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732, 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)) (affirming defen-
dant's rape conviction where defendant obtained intercourse by fraudulently posing as a security guard).
For another case suggesting the distinction has been abolished, see State v. Mitchell, III, No. M1996-
00008-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 559930, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 30, 1999) (explaining that "the
fraud may go directly to the penetration itself, or may relate to the inducement of the sexual act").
108 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.D. 1.
109 For a discussion of thick and thin, or broad and narrow, conceptions of the act of which the fraud
renders the victim unaware, see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
110 For a discussion of the "nature of the act" standard of fraud as applied to spousal impersonation,
see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
I ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406A (2001).
112 Id. § 13-1401(5)(c) (emphasis added).
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California and Idaho," 3 as well as Nebraska," 4 utilize this standard. The
Model Penal Code Commentary perhaps best articulates the underlying
premise of liability in these types of provisions by explaining that a person
"who is deceived as to the nature of the act does not give meaningful con-
sent to intercourse.""15
Therefore, adult impersonation readily qualifies as rape by fraud in the
above four jurisdictions." 6 The victim of adult impersonation is certainly
unaware of the nature of the act. The defrauded victim believes that s/he is
engaging in lawful intercourse but is in fact engaging in statutory rape.
b. Essential characteristics of the act.-Fraud rendering the vic-
tim unaware of essential characteristics" 7 of the sexual intercourse consti-
tutes rape by fraud. In California, rape includes engaging in intercourse
with a victim who is "not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's fraud in fact."" 8
This statutory language was construed in People v. Chang in which a mas-
sage therapist, under the guise of therapeutic treatment, digitally penetrated
a patient."9 Despite the victim's awareness of the digital penetration, 2 ° the
defendant was convicted of rape by fraud. On appeal, the defendant con-
tended that the evidence only supported fraud in the inducement and did not
support the requisite "'fraud' in fact."'' Upholding the conviction, the ap-
113 E.g.. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) (defining rape to include inter-
course with a victim who "is unconscious of the nature of the act"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5)
(2004) (defining rape as penetration accomplished "[w]here she is at the time unconscious of 'the nature
of the act"'); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 330 (Official Code and Revised Comments,
1985) (construing the phrase "'unconscious of the nature of the act' ... to cover instances of deception
as well as cases of literal unconsciousness").
114 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(l)(a) (1995) (criminalizing intercourse where "any person subjects
another to sexual penetration without consent of the victim"); id. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (emphasis added)
(declaring that the term "[w]ithout consent means the consent, if any was actually given, was the result
of the actor's deception as... to the nature or purpose of the act").
115 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 330.
116 See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
117 Similar to the essential characteristics standard, fraud rendering the victim unaware of a "funda-
mental aspect" of the sexual intercourse may also constitute rape by fraud. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at
585. Joshua Dressier explains "[m]ost courts" treat spousal impersonation "as fraud-in-the-factum (and,
therefore, rape), on the ground that the attendant circumstance that the male was not the female's hus-
band was a fundamental aspect of the sexual act; therefore, the female did not know what it was that she
was consenting to do." Id. (emphasis added).
118 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (a)(4)(C) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
119 No. D042603, 2004 WL 2058377, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2004). For another case con-
struing this statutory language, see In re Billy L., No. A104452, 2005 WL 459057, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 28, 2005) (affirming the adjudication of a minor as a ward of the court for obtaining oral copulation
by fraud). The court ruled that the victim was "'not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the es-
sential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's fraud."' Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §
261 (a)(4)(C)).
120 Chang, 2004 WL 2058377, at *1.
121 Id. at *2 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(C)).
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pellate court ruled that the victim "was not aware of the essential character-
istics of the act due to Chang's fraudulent representation he was massaging
her groin in order to relieve her back pain." '122 The appellate court also up-
held the trial court's jury instruction on the requisite fraud: 23  "[F]raud in
fact is a false representation of the essential characteristics of the act.' ' 24
Adult impersonation persuasively qualifies as rape by fraud under this
standard. That the defrauded victim's act constitutes statutory rape, possi-
bly subjecting the defrauded victim to twenty years of imprisonment, is
clearly an essential characteristic of the act. Could the prospect of such se-
rious punishment be considered an inessential or trivial aspect of the act?
Since the victim of adult impersonation is unaware of an essential charac-
teristic of the intercourse (its criminal nature), obtaining intercourse by
adult impersonation constitutes rape by fraud under this standard. 25
c. Materiality.--Obtaining intercourse by a misrepresentation of
a material fact constitutes rape by fraud.'26 For example, in upholding the
defendant's rape-by-fraud conviction for obtaining intercourse with the vic-
tim by impersonating her fianc6, a Tennessee court adopted a definition of
fraud requiring that the defendant "'intentionally misrepresent[] an existing,
material fact."" 27 That the defendant was not the victim's fianc6, the court
held, was a material fact. 2 Courts in Iowa, Nevada, and Indiana upheld
convictions for inducing sexual conduct under the guises of scientific ex-
perimentation and medical treatment by applying the same materiality stan-
dard--"[t]he victims had consented to one thing, and the defendants did
122 Id. at *3.
123 The trial court defined fraud in the fact without distinguishing it from fraud in the inducement:
"'The term 'fraud in fact,' as used in the preceding instruction, means a false representation of a matter
of fact, whether by words or by conduct, which deceives and is intended to deceive another person."'
Id. at *5 n.3 (quoting from the trial court's jury instruction).
124 Id.
125 Dressler's analysis of why spousal impersonation constitutes fraud in the factum and thus rape
by fraud, see supra text accompanying note 117, applies equally well to adult impersonation. Consider
the following paraphrase of Dressler's rationale: adult impersonation constitutes fraud in the factum on
the ground that the attendant circumstance that the juvenile is not above the age of consent (and thus that
the intercourse is not lawful) is a fundamental aspect of the sexual act. Therefore, the victim of adult
impersonation did not know what it was that s/he was consenting to do. As a result, to the extent that
most courts treat spousal impersonation as rape by fraud on the ground that the victim was unaware of a
fundamental aspect of the intercourse, these same courts should also treat adult impersonation as rape by
fraud. For a further discussion of spousal impersonation, see infra Part 1I.B.2.
126 Martha Chamallas furnishes the most fundamental conception of materiality-a representation
that is significant. See Chamallas, supra note 7, at 833 (contrasting material misrepresentations with
those "which will be dismissed as insignificant").
127 State v. Mitchell, Ill, No. M1996-00008-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 559930, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. July 30, 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992)) ("'A per-
son acts fraudulently when (1) the person intentionally misrepresents an existing, material fact, or pro-
duces a false impression, in order to mislead another or to obtain an undue advantage, and (2) another is
injured because of reasonable reliance on that representation."'), aft'd, 88 S.W.3d 561 (Tenn. 2002).
128 Mitchell, I1, 1999 WL 559930, at *1.
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something materially different."' 29 Despite the above victims' awareness of
the sexual conduct itself, the defendants' misrepresentations still rendered
the victims unaware of material facts.
Numerous commentators also have advanced conceptions of a materi-
ality standard for the requisite fraud in rape by fraud. 3 ' Susan Estrich, per-
haps the first commentator to advocate a materiality standard,"' argues that
any state's rape law should prohibit "exactly the same deceptions as that
state's law of false pretences or fraud."' 32 Stephen Schulhofer agrees that
the standard used for fraud in property transactions---"the misrepresentation
is material and the other party could justifiably rely on it"-also should ap-
ply to intercourse obtained by fraud.'33 Patricia Falk'34 and Jane Larson 35
require, for a misrepresentation to be material, that the victim's reliance on
it be reasonable. Other commentators focus on the importance of the mis-
representation in the victim's decision to acquiesce to the intercourse.'36
Adult impersonation convincingly qualifies as a material fraud. The
victim consented to one thing (lawful intercourse) but received something
materially different (unlawful intercourse). Clearly, a misrepresentation
that makes the crucial difference between lawful intercourse and statutory
rape is a misrepresentation that is sufficiently significant'37 and nontrivial to
be material. 3 ' Adult impersonation could also satisfy the numerous other
129 State v. Vander Esch, 662 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (citing McNair v. State, 825
P.2d 571, 574 (Nev. 1992)) (affirming defendant's conviction on four counts of sexual abuse in the third
degree for obtaining semen sample collections from victims by fraudulently representing such collection
was for scientific research); McNair, 825 P.2d at 574 (quoting R v. Flattery, 2 Q.B.D. 410, 413 (1877));
Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 102 (1884) (affirming defendant's rape conviction for obtaining inter-
course by fraudulently purporting to perform a medical operation). The Indiana Supreme Court articu-
lated the standard slightly differently--"'[s]he consented to one thing, he did another materially
different."' Id. (quoting R v. Case, 1 Den. Cr. C. 580, 582 (1850)).
130 See LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 768 (noting this standard as among the approaches that scholars
have advanced); Falk, supra note 17, at 166-68 (surveying approaches to the materiality standard).
131 ESTRICH, supra note 15, at 102-03 (arguing that "[t]he 'force' or 'coercion' [elements of the tra-
ditional conception of rape] that negates consent ought to be defined to include extortionate threats and
material misrepresentations of material fact").
132 Estrich, supra note 7, at 1182.
133 SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 154-55 (emphasis omitted). "Where these requirements [of ma-
teriality] are clearly met.... the deceived woman has suffered serious harm, and there is little reason to
tolerate the defendant's misconduct." Id. at 155.
134 Falk, supra note 17, at 166 (characterizing the materiality standard as comprising the following
three components: "(1) the misrepresentation must be material, (2) the victim's reliance must be reason-
able, and (3) the actor must have intended to mislead when making the misrepresentation").
135 Larson, supra note 80, at 453 (proposing the standard, for tort liability for intercourse obtained
by fraud, of whether a reasonable person would acquiesce to the intercourse due to the fraud).
136 LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 768 (describing the standard as "the materiality of the misrepresenta-
tion to the victim's decision-making process"); Feinberg, supra note 12, at 341-42 (cataloguing the
standards for materiality based on how central the misrepresentation is to the victim's decision to acqui-
esce--dispositive, a sufficient condition, a necessary but insufficient condition, or a mere factor).
137 See supra note 126.
138 See supra note 9.
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criteria advanced by commentators: (i) the misrepresentation was suffi-
ciently central in the victim's decision to acquiesce to intercourse,'39 (ii) the
victim reasonably'4° and justifiably 4' relied on the misrepresentation, and
(iii) the defrauding party intentionally misled the victim. 42 As a result,
adult impersonation qualifies as rape by fraud under the criteria for materi-
ality in the four jurisdictions above, as well as under commentators' ap-
proaches.
B. Context-Specific Types of Fraud
The two context-specific types of fraud most relevant to adult imper-
sonation are spousal impersonation and impersonation in general, or iden-
tity fraud. In both, the fraud renders the victim unaware not of the
intercourse itself, but of the identity, or some specific aspect of the identity,
of the victim's sexual partner. Both spousal impersonation and adult im-
personation are subsets of identity fraud and thus might be criminalized in
any jurisdiction criminalizing identity fraud. And by satisfying the ration-
ale of spousal impersonation as rape, adult impersonation qualifies as rape
in the same jurisdictions that criminalize spousal impersonation.
1. Identity Fraud or Impersonation.-Several jurisdictions broadly
criminalize identity fraud used to obtain intercourse.'43 For example, Ne-
braska criminalizes intercourse obtained by "deception as to the identity of
the actor."'" Recent cases in at least three other jurisdictions, as well as in
England, have found rape liability where the defendant fraudulently ob-
tained intercourse by posing as the victim's fianc 145 or lover.146 Most
commentators agree. 147
139 See sources cited supra note 136.
140 See sources cited supra notes 134-35.
141 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 134.
!43 The recognition of identity fraud, in general, as a basis for rape by fraud is fairly recent. As late
as 1982, Perkins and Boyce noted that identity fraud does not constitute rape by fraud. PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 25, at 216. For a discussion of why spousal impersonation might constitute an even
stronger basis for establishing rape by fraud liability than identity fraud, see infra note 169.
144 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (1995). Under the Nebraska statutory scheme, among the
ways sexual assault can be committed is sexual contact "without the consent of the victim." Id. § 28-
320(1)(a) (1995). Nebraska defines absence of consent as including where the victim's "consent, if any
was actually given, was the result of the actor's deception as to the identity of the actor." Id. § 28-
318(8)(a)(iv) (1995). Apparently, there are no reported Nebraska decisions construing this statutory
language.
145 People v. Crippen, 617 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming conviction of defen-
dant for rape by fraud for fraudulently impersonating victim's fianc6 in order to obtain intercourse);
State v. Mitchell, Ill, No. M1996-00008-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 559930, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. July
30, 1999).
146 United States v. Booker, 25 M.J. 114, 117 (C.M.A. 1987) (affirming conviction of defendant, a
naval fireman, for rape by fraud by fraudulently impersonating victim's lover to secure intercourse); R
v. Elbekkay, [1995] Crim. L. R. 163, 164 (holding that defendant's impersonation of victim's boyfriend
101:75 (2007)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The rationale is that the identity of the victim's sexual partner is part of
the act to which the victim consents. In upholding the defendant's rape
conviction for obtaining intercourse by impersonating the victim's lover in
United States v. Booker, the United States Court of Military Appeals con-
sidered whether impersonation constitutes fraud in the factum or in the in-
ducement.'48 Identity fraud constitutes fraud in the factum, according to the
court, because consent to the act is based on "both the nature of the act and
some knowledge of the identity of the participant."'49 The court concluded
that impersonation, as fraud in the factum, constitutes rape by fraud because
it vitiates the victim's actual consent to the intercourse. 150
While recognition of identity fraud properly broadens rape by fraud
beyond spousal impersonation cases, 5' there may be limits. Booker de-
to obtain intercourse constitutes rape by fraud). Impersonation is also a basis for rape by fraud liability
in Canada. See R v. Cuerrier, [1998] 162 D.L.R.4th 513, 534 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., concurring) ("Ca-
nadian courts for over a hundred years accepted that fraud as to identity could negate consent ... ").
For a case hinting at rape by fraud liability for identity fraud, see People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d
884, 886-87 (Dist. Ct. 1994) (granting motion to dismiss charge of sexual misconduct for obtaining in-
tercourse by impersonating victim's lover). The court intimated that though fraud would not vitiate the
consent of the victim for the specific offense of sexual misconduct, identity fraud might constitute the
offense of sexual abuse. Id. at 887. For the crime of sexual abuse, the conception of the victim's lack of
consent is broader and is "extended to 'any circumstances ... in which the victim does not expressly or
impliedly acquiesce in the actor's conduct."' Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(c) (McKinney
2004)). The court observed that "the District Attorney's office has charged the defendant with the
wrong crime," id. at 887, and invited the prosecutor to charge "the defendant with another crime that
encompasses the defendant's conduct." Id.
147 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585 ("Seemingly, it should constitute rape to impersonate
anyone with whom the victim has been sexually intimate."); SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 159 (main-
taining that "impersonation is an especially serious form of deception" that is deservedly criminalized);
id. at 284 (criminalizing, in his Model Criminal Statute for Sexual Offenses, intercourse obtained by an
actor "leading the victim to believe that he is a person with whom the victim has been sexually inti-
mate"); Falk, supra note 17, at 70 (arguing that rather than trying to fit identity fraud within the fraud in
the factum-inducement dichotomy, "a superior approach may be simply to outlaw fraud as to identity in
securing sexual compliance"); Jocelynne A. Scutt, Fraudulent Impersonation and Consent in Rape, 9 U.
QUEENSLAND L.J. 59, 65 (1975) (arguing that differential treatment of spousal impersonations and im-
personations of a non-married person raises issues of unfair discrimination).
148 25 M.J. at 116-17.
149 Id. at 116. The court explains that "while it is arguable that there may be people who are willing
to hop into bed with absolutely anyone, we take it that even the most uninhibited people ordinarily make
some assessment of a potential sex partner and exercise some modicum of discretion before consenting
to sexual intercourse." Id.
150 As the concurring opinion characterizes the majority opinion, "purported consent to intercourse
is invalid if the woman has misidentified the man with whom she has intercourse because the identity of
the sex partner is part of the nature of the act to which the woman agrees." Id. at 119 (Sullivan, J., con-
curring).
151 As a recent English case put it, in erasing the distinction between spousal and other types of im-
personation and finding impersonation to be rape by fraud, "[w]e see no reason to distinguish between
consent obtained by impersonating a husband and consent obtained by impersonating another man, so
that latter case should also constitute rape." R v. Linekar, (1995) Q.B. 250, 255 (A.C.).
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clares that neither obtaining intercourse by the "use of a false name"'52 nor
posing as unmarried suffices as rape by fraud.'53 In suggesting the exclu-
sion of celebrity impersonation from rape-by-fraud liability, Joel Feinberg
offers the following hypothetical. Suppose a defendant fraudulently poses
as "rock star Johnny Limbo" to obtain intercourse with an ardent fan.'54
Feinberg argues that celebrity impersonation, as opposed to spousal imper-
sonation, is fraud in the inducement and thus not rape by fraud for a number
of reasons. 5 5 First, unlike the victim of spousal impersonation, the victim
of celebrity impersonation is not tricked into an unlawful act, like adul-
tery.'56 Second, the victim of spousal impersonation will "suffer a greater
harm, or at least more severe psychological trauma" as opposed to the mere
"disappointment" of the celebrity impersonation victim.'57 Third, Feinberg
concludes, while the spousal impersonation victim suffers an "evil," the ce-
lebrity impersonation victim receives a "mere nonbenefit," or foregoes "a
good."'58
Is being underage sufficiently part of one's identity for adult imper-
sonation to qualify as identity fraud constituting rape? Because adult im-
personation generates the very serious consequence of exposure to criminal
liability for statutory rape for the defrauded victim, knowledge that one's
partner is underage might satisfy Booker's requisite "some knowledge of
the identity of the participant."'59 Such knowledge would clearly be more
relevant than knowledge of the participant's true name and marital status-
the two examples disqualified by Booker as rape by fraud. 6 ° In addition,
adult impersonation, like spousal impersonation, compares favorably with
celebrity impersonation for constituting rape by fraud. The victim of adult
impersonation is tricked into committing an unlawful act and suffers serious
harm if criminal liability attaches rather than merely being disappointed by
a nonbenefit. 6' On this basis, adult impersonation probably qualifies as
identity fraud, and thus as rape by fraud, in the above four jurisdictions.
2. Spousal Impersonation.-While some authorities maintain that the
majority of jurisdictions recognize spousal impersonation as rape by
152 25 M.J. at 116 (explaining that the "use of a false name may well amount to fraud in the in-
ducement, but it does not alone vitiate consent").
153 Id. (noting that obtaining intercourse by posing as unmarried is only fraud in the inducement,
and thus does not constitute rape by fraud).
154 Feinberg, supra note 12, at 344 (explaining that the ardent fan "has heard all his records but has
never seen his photographs").




159 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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fraud,162 only sixteen explicitly do so.'6 3 By statute, eleven jurisdictions, as
well as the Model Penal Code, explicitly recognize spousal impersonation
as rape by fraud." 4 And in five others, the courts explicitly recognize it de-
spite the absence of a specific statutory provision.'65
The primary rationale for spousal impersonation constituting rape by
fraud is that the victim consents to lawful, marital intercourse, but instead
162 See Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("In California, of
course, we have by statute adopted the majority view that such fraud [spousal impersonation] is in the
factum, not the inducement, and have thus held it to vitiate consent."); DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585
("Most courts, however, treat this deception [spousal impersonation] as fraud-in-the-factum (and, there-
fore, rape)."); WESTEN, supra note 14, at 199 ("California has concluded, as most jurisdictions have, that
spouse-impersonators ought to be punished, and it has done so by stating that victims of spouse-
impersonation are victims of fraud in the factum."). But see People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 918-19
(Sup. Ct. 1975) ("The prevailing view in this country is that [obtaining intercourse by spousal imper-
sonation is not rape]."); Commonwealth v. Culbreath, No. 88103, 1995 WL 1055824, at * I (Va. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 4, 1995) ("The law in Virginia and in the majority of states is that no rape occurs where a person
impersonates another in order to obtain the victim's consent to sexual intercourse.").
163 See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
164 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(4) (West 1997 & Supp. 2005) ("No person shall
engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply:
.. (4) The offender knows that the other person submits because the other person mistakenly identifies
the offender as the other person's spouse."). The following statutes contain largely identical language:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(d) (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(5) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(l)(c) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(6) (2004); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43(3) (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § I 111(A)(6) (West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
5-406(7) (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iv) (2005); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4061(e) (2004);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985). Although Alabama's
statute does not explicitly criminalize spousal impersonation, the official statutory commentary ex-
pressly states that the provision does encompass spousal impersonation as rape by fraud. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (statutory commentary) ("This subsection includes the of-
fense of carnal knowledge of a married woman by falsely personating her husband ... ").
165 See State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54, 54-56 (1828) (affirming defendant's conviction of assault with
an intent to commit rape accomplished via spousal impersonation); Pinson v. State, 518 So. 2d 1220,
1224 (Miss. 1988) (affirming defendant's conviction for rape via spousal impersonation and rejecting
defendant's argument that spousal impersonation is something less than rape as "ludicrous"); State v.
Atkins, 292 S.W. 422, 426 (Mo. 1926) (stating, in dicta, that spousal impersonation constitutes rape in
Missouri on the basis that the fraud vitiates the consent of the victim); State v. Williams, 37 S.E. 952,
953 (N.C. 1901) (affirming defendant's conviction for rape accomplished via spousal impersonation
even in the absence of verbal, fraudulent representations); State v. Bancroft, 137 N.W. 37, 39 (N.D.
1912) (noting, in dicta, that spousal impersonation constitutes rape in North Dakota).
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receives unlawful, adulterous intercourse.'66 That is, the victim consents to
one act, but receives something entirely different' 7 :
The act of marital intercourse and the act of adultery are as far apart as day and
night and it is atrocious to suggest that willing submission by a wife to what is
supposed by her in good faith, and on good grounds, to be lawful intercourse
with her husband, is consent to an act of adultery with another.'68
The unlawful quality of the intercourse is such a fundamental feature of the
act that it is an integral part of the act or nature of the act.'69 Since the vic-
tim is unaware of the unlawful nature of the intercourse-an integral part of
the act-the victim is unaware of the very act or nature of the act. As Per-
kins and Boyce argue, "it is quite unsound to hold that the woman [the vic-
tim of spousal impersonation] is not deceived as to the very act done.' ' 7
Since the victim is unaware of the act or nature of the act, the fraud consti-
166 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 767 ("[Spousal impersonation] has been characterized as
fraud in the factum, apparently on the ground that it should suffice that she [the victim] perceived the
situation as one of lawful intercourse with her husband rather than adultery."); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra
note 25, at 1080-81 (explaining that spousal impersonation constitutes rape by fraud because the vic-
tim's "consent is to an innocent act of marital intercourse while what is actually perpetrated upon her is
an act of adultery"); Falk, supra note 17, at 66-67 ("[H]usband impersonation cases really involve fraud
in the factum because the woman has consented to marital intercourse not adultery and, therefore, the
impersonator's fraud vitiates her consent.").
167 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
168 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 25, at 216 (emphasis added).
169 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585 (explaining that the perpetrator not being the victim's
spouse is "a fundamental aspect of the sexual act"). To see this point more clearly compare a case of
spousal impersonation with a case of a wife who is expecting her adulterous lover but instead is de-
frauded into intercourse with another (neither her husband nor her lover):
[Consider] the rogue who, in the dark, got into bed with a married woman who knew he was not
her husband but submitted to sexual intercourse in the belief that he was her paramour with whom
she had arranged a meretricious tryst. Although he had learned of the tryst, detained the paramour
elsewhere with a false message and fraudulently imposed upon the woman, he had not committed
rape. This was not fraud in thefactum. There was nothing comparable to the difference between
marital intercourse and adultery. The woman consented to the adulterous intercourse, having been
induced to consent because deceived as to the person-fraud in the inducement. She would have
no defense to a prosecution for adultery, where that is a punishable offense, nor to a charge of
adultery in a divorce action, although the woman who submitted believing the man was her hus-
band would have a complete answer to both.
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 25, at 216. Thus, fraud which induces a victim into intercourse that s/he
believes is adulterous intercourse and is, in fact, adulterous intercourse constitutes, according to Perkins
and Boyce, only fraud in the inducement and is not rape by fraud. But where the victim is defrauded
into believing that the intercourse is permissible marital intercourse but is, in fact, impermissible adul-
terous intercourse, the fraud constitutes fraud in the factum and is rape by fraud. In the former case, the
victim was not defrauded as to the legal nature of the act-s/he correctly believed it to be impermissible
(adulterous) intercourse. In the latter case, the victim was defrauded as to the legal nature of the inter-
course-s/he believed it to be permissible (marital) intercourse but instead engaged in impermissible
(adulterous) intercourse.
170 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 25, at 215.
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tutes fraud in the factum. 7' As fraud in the factum, spousal impersonation
vitiates the consent of the victim and constitutes rape by fraud.'
The rationale for spousal impersonation constituting rape by fraud not
only applies to adult impersonation, it applies even more strongly. The vic-
tims of both consent to innocent and lawful intercourse, but instead receive
unlawful intercourse.' The unlawful nature of the intercourse is funda-
mental to the nature of the act and thus the victims are deceived as to the
very act done. Therefore, both frauds constitute fraud in the factum. And if
spousal impersonation constitutes rape by fraud on this basis, then afortiori
adult impersonation constitutes rape by fraud. The victim of adult imper-
sonation is defrauded into committing a much more serious crime (statutory
rape) than is the victim of spousal impersonation (adultery). As a result,
adult impersonation convincingly qualifies as rape by fraud in at least the
above sixteen jurisdictions.
C. Conceptions of Consent
While the last two sections canvassed general standards of fraud and
context-specific types of fraud, this section addresses fraud's effect on con-
sent. Under two consent standards-"global consent"'74 and knowing and
voluntary consent-fraud vitiates the victim's consent to intercourse,
thereby transforming the intercourse into rape.
1. Global Consent Statutes.-As many as twelve states follow the
Model Penal Code in promulgating global consent provisions declaring that
deception renders the victim's consent legally ineffective.'75 For example,
171 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
172 See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 25, at 1080-81 (maintaining that spousal impersonation
constitutes rape by fraud because it constitutes fraud in the factum); Falk, supra note 17, at 66-67 (ex-
plaining that because spousal impersonation is fraud in the factum, the fraud vitiates the victim's con-
sent); see also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
173 Consider the following paraphrase of Perkins and Boyce's explanation of why spousal imper-
sonation constitutes rape by fraud, see supra text accompanying note 168, as applied to adult impersona-
tion: the act of lawful intercourse and the act of statutory rape are as far apart as night and day and it is
atrocious to suggest that willing submission by the defrauded victim to what is supposed in good faith,
and on good grounds, to be lawful intercourse, is consent to an act of statutory rape.
174 So-called "global consent" or "generic" consent provisions are meant to apply not merely to
consent in sexual offenses but to a jurisdiction's entire penal code. See LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 768
(terming them definitions of "global consent"); Falk, supra note 17, at 114 ("Some states have generic
consent provisions applying to all types of criminal offenses not just sexual crimes.").
175 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.1 l(3)(d) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985) ("Ineffective
Consent. Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not
constitute consent if: it is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the
law defining the offense."). Two states adopt the language of the Model Penal Code provision verbatim.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10(c)(3) (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 31 1(C)(4) (West 1998). Eight
additional states declare consent to be ineffective by adopting the Model Penal Code language, "if it is
induced by force, duress or deception." See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c)(4) (LexisNexis 2005); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3)(d) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 453(4) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-
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Missouri defines consent as invalid "if it is induced by force, duress, or de-
ception."'76 Under these global consent provisions, the requisite type of de-
ception or fraud is without specific limitation. These global consent
provisions may even, in effect, abolish the distinction between fraud in the
factum and fraud in the inducement. 77  Therefore, inducing the victim's
consent by deception or fraud renders the victim's consent legally ineffec-
tive and may subject the perpetrator to liability for rape by fraud.
Adult impersonation, by vitiating the consent of the defrauded victim,
qualifies as rape by fraud under these statutory global consent provisions.
The victim's consent to the intercourse is ineffective because of the juve-
nile's fraudulent representation as to being of age. As a result, adult imper-
sonation plausibly constitutes rape by fraud under the Model Penal Code
and the twelve jurisdictions largely adopting the Model Penal Code's global
consent provision.
2. Knowing and Voluntary Consent.-Fraud likewise renders the vic-
tim's consent ineffective under a knowing and voluntary consent standard.
By statute, Florida, Wisconsin, Illinois, and California criminalize inter-
course in the absence of the victim's "intelligent, knowing and voluntary
consent," '78 "informed consent,' ' 79 "knowing consent,"' tt and "knowledge
235(4) (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109(3)(C) (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(5)(C)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211( 2 )(c) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-
08(2)(c) (1997). Two additional states have similar provisions stating that fraud renders the victim's
consent ineffective. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (2003) ("Consent is not effective
when: Induced by deception .... "); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(19)(A) (Vernon 2003 & Supp.
2005) ("Consent is not effective if: induced by... fraud."). For cases construing these global consent
provisions, see, for example, State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846, 849 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming defen-
dant's third-degree rape conviction where defendant's fraud vitiated victim's consent within the mean-
ing of the global consent provision); Smith v. State, 873 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Tex. App. 1993) (affirming
defendant's sexual assault conviction and applying both the broad global consent provision and the nar-
rower definition of consent within the sexual assault provision).
176 MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(5)(c) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006).
177 See LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 769 (commenting that global consent statutes are "likely to be in-
terpreted as superceding the factum-inducement distinction"). For cases abolishing the distinction, see
supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
178 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01 l(l)(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). Under Florida's statutory scheme,
"a person who commits sexual battery ... without that person's consent ... commits a felony of the
second degree." Id. § 794.011(5). The term "'sexual battery' is defined as sexual "penetration." Id. §
794.01 l(1)(h). "The term 'consent' means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent .... " Id. §
794.01 l(1)(a). For an interpretation of Florida's consent provision, see, for example, Coley v. State, 616
So. 2d 1017, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing defendant's conviction for sexual battery based
on defendant's lack of awareness that victim was unable to give knowing consent). The court explained
the requisite standard for knowing consent as "a showing that the victim was unable to give a knowing
and voluntary consent, and-in order to charge defendant with criminal responsibility-that the inability
to consent was known or apparent to the defendant." Id.
179 WtS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2005). Under Wisconsin's statutory scheme, a person who
"has sexual intercourse with a person without the consent of that person is guilty" of felonious third-
degree sexual assault. Id. § 940.225(3). Consent is defined as "words or overt actions by a person who
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of the nature of the act,"'' respectively. Several courts have construed this
consent standard's application to fraud."2 For example, in People v.
Whitten, an Illinois court defined knowing consent as "a willingness, volun-
tariness, free will, reasoned or intelligent choice . . .unclouded by fraud,
duress, or mistake."'83 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
a respiratory therapist for a sexual assault perpetrated by fraud in People v.
Quinlan. 4 The court ruled that the victim's consent was to "an invasive
medical procedure, not to sexual acts."'8 5 Since the victim received sexual
penetration rather than medical treatment, the victim "did not give knowing
consent."'86 Similarly, the court in Wisconsin v. Dantes'87 ruled that the vic-
tim consented to treatment from a hypnotist for weight loss, but not to sex-
ual contact. 88 Since the victim received bodily touching of a sexual nature
rather than treatment, the victim did not give "'informed consent."" 9
Adult impersonation, by vitiating knowing and voluntary consent,
qualifies as rape by fraud. The victim of adult impersonation submits to in-
tercourse because the juvenile misrepresents being of age. Therefore, the
defrauded victim does not give informed and knowing consent to the inter-
is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or
sexual contact." Id. § 940.225(4).
180 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13(a)(2) (West 2002) ("The accused commits criminal sexual
assault if he or she: commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the victim ... was
unable to give knowing consent.").
181 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 1999) ("In prosecutions under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or
289, in which consent is at issue, 'consent' shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or atti-
tude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowl-
edge of the nature of the act or transaction involved."). For an explanation of the various sexual
offenses committed under California law by a perpetrator who engages in intercourse without the vic-
tim's consent, see People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
182 For cases construing Illinois' knowing consent standard apart from its application to fraud, see,
for example, People v. Beasley, 732 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (affirming defendant's
criminal sexual assault conviction for intercourse with victim who was unable to give knowing consent
on the basis that the "State need only establish that due to circumstances beyond her [the victim's] con-
trol she was unable to give knowing consent."); People v. Fisher, 667 N.E.2d 142, 148 (I1. App. Ct.
1996) (affirming defendant's conviction of criminal sexual penetration committed against a victim un-
able to give knowing consent that included "freely given agreement"); id. ("Whether one did not freely
agree to intercourse, or whether one was, for whatever reason, unable to freely agree to intercourse, the
definition of 'consent' remains the same.").
I83 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (affirming defendant's conviction of criminal sexual
assault for intercourse with victim who was unable to give knowing consent).
184 596 N.E.2d 28, 31 (111. App. Ct. 1992) ("Knowing consent 'presupposes an intelligence capable
of understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences."' (quoting People v. Blunt, 65 Il. App.
2d 268, 274 (1965))).
185 Id. at 31.
186 Id.
187 No. 83-1596-CR, 1984 WL 180541, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 1984) (affirming defendant's
fourth-degree sexual assault conviction for obtaining sexual contact without the victim's consent).
188 Id.
189 Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2005)).
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course. As a result, obtaining intercourse by adult impersonation convinc-
ingly qualifies as rape by fraud in the above four jurisdictions.
D. Objections
This section anticipates the following five possible objections to treat-
ing intercourse obtained by adult impersonation as rape by fraud. First,
recognizing any new form of rape by fraud triggers line-drawing difficul-
ties. That is, recognizing a new form of rape by fraud opens a Pandora's
box that cannot be closed. Second, a juvenile's legal incapacity to consent
precludes a juvenile's criminal liability for rape. Third, the general rule that
a victim of a crime cannot be an accomplice to that very crime bars a statu-
tory rape victim from criminal liability for rape. Fourth, as the victim of
rape, the juvenile cannot be the perpetrator of rape. And fifth, recognizing
adult impersonation as rape by fraud will chill statutory rape prosecutions.
We will rebut each of these possible objections. 9°
1. Line-Drawing Concerns.-The shared concern of both defenders
and critics of the law's trend toward expanding the scope of rape-by-fraud
liability is where to draw the line between fraud that is deserving of crimi-
nalization and fraud that is not. 9' While most agree that spousal imper-
sonation and fraudulent medical treatment should be criminalized, courts
and commentators have struggled with delineating principles and standards
that would be sufficiently inclusive to accommodate serious fraud while ex-
cluding exaggerations of affection, romantic commitment, societal status,
and wealth.'92 Thus the most formidable obstacle any candidate for rape by
fraud must overcome is the common refrain-if we allow this to be rape by
fraud, where do we draw the line?'93 Skeptics fret that any expansion of
rape-by-fraud liability beyond its narrow, historic categories will open a
190 For resolutions to other possible objections, see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 585 (noting that the law of rape by fraud poses "difficult
matters of line-drawing"); LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 768 ("The difficulty, of course, is in drawing clear
lines without giving protection to interests not worthy of being protected by criminal sanctions .... );
WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 198 ("[li]t may, in fact, be difficult to distinguish between those decep-
tions that are not seriously wrong and certainly should not be illegal and those that are legitimate candi-
dates for prohibition.").
192 See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 198-99 ("So the problem is this. If some sexual de-
ceptions are to be regarded as morally and legally permissible whereas others are not, how can we dis-
tinguish between those two categories?"); Feinberg, supra note 12, at 335 (noting that "conceptual
boundary lines are hard to draw"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143
U. PA. L. REv. 2151, 2176 (1995) (commenting that "the boundary problem is acute").
193 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 331 (Official Draft and Revised Comments,
1985) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing some possibly legitimate candidates for rape by fraud li-
ability "from many instances of ordinary seduction"); WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 214 ("[A]n at-
tempt to provide civil remedies or criminal sanctions for sexual deception is likely to encounter a range
of genuine line-drawing and evidentiary difficulties."); Chamallas, supra note 7, at 833 ("Perhaps the
principal impediment to criminalizing rape by fraud is the desire to avoid the difficult task of choosing
which lies will be treated as material and which will be dismissed as insignificant.").
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Pandora's box that cannot be closed.'94 With respect to adult impersona-
tion, however, this concern is groundless.
Adult impersonation features a unique rationale for qualifying as rape
by fraud. Consequently, its recognition will not furnish a conceptual toe-
hold for recognizing other types of fraud. The most fundamental basis war-
ranting adult impersonation's inclusion as rape by fraud is the very serious
consequence and harm suffered by the victim-the prospect of severe
criminal punishment.'95 Commentators maintain that the harmful conse-
quences suffered by the defrauded victim are, if not dispositive, one of the
most important factors in determining whether an instance of fraud suffices
for rape-by-fraud liability.'96 For example, Alan Wertheimer stresses that
"[i]t is the consequences of deception that worry us, not the deception it-
self."'97 In general, the greater the degree of harm suffered by the victim of
the misrepresentation, the comparatively more likely it constitutes rape by
fraud.'9 8 Few, if any, candidates for rape by fraud entail the degree of harm
suffered by the victim of adult impersonation. But this alone is not what
makes adult impersonation unique.
No other candidate for rape-by-fraud liability entails the type of harm
suffered by the adult impersonation victim--criminal liability and punish-
ment. While fraud imposing a metaphorical "sentence" of harm is used to
justify rape-by-fraud liability,'" only adult impersonation imposes the pros-
pect of serious criminal punishment. Moreover, even among accepted types
194 See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("[W]here
consent to intercourse is obtained by promises of travel, fame, celebrity and the like--ought the liar and
seducer to be chargeable as a rapist? Where is the line to be drawn?"); R v. Cuerrier, [1998] 162
D.L.R.4th 513, 545 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., concurring) ("The argument is made that to go beyond these
criteria [the victim being unaware of either the intercourse itself or the identity of the perpetrator] would
be to open the door to convictions for assault [or rape] in the case, for example, where a man promises a
woman a fur coat in return for sexual intercourse ...."); Berger, supra note 79, at 76 (posing the ques-
tion, "What, finally, would be the limits of liability for rape by fraud?").
195 See supra notes 10- 11 and accompanying text.
196 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 27, at 155-57 (utilizing repeatedly the criterion of harm suf-
fered by the defrauded victim to sort out which cases of fraud suffice to establish rape liability);
Feinberg, supra note 12, at 336-37, 339-41, 344-45 (employing a standard of comparative harm to de-
termine in several cases which types of fraud warrant rape by fraud liability). For example, Feinberg
compares the case of a patient who is fraudulently induced into having intercourse by a doctor who of-
fers the patient money for intercourse and then fails to pay with the case of a patient who is fraudulently
induced to have intercourse under the pretext of a gynecological exam. Id. at 336-37. According to
Feinberg, the unpaid patient is not the victim of rape by fraud, in part, because "she has not suffered a
clear harm when she is not paid." Id. at 336. But the gynecological patient may well be the victim of
rape by fraud because, in part, she "could have been severely harmed" by the fraud. Id. at 337. For an
additional example, see supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
197 WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 195.
198 See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 195, 200-04; Feinberg, supra note 12, at 344-45.
199 Cuerrier, 162 D.L.R.4th at 546 (McLachlin, J., concurring) (justifying defendant's rape by fraud
liability for obtaining intercourse by failing to inform his partner that he was HlV-positive on the basis
that the fraud imposed a "potential sentence of disease or death").
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of rape by fraud, none entails the significant possibility of criminal liability
and severe punishment. 20 Adult impersonation's unique combination of the
type and degree of harmful consequence suffered by the defrauded victim
not only affords a stronger basis for rape-by-fraud liability than widely ac-
cepted forms of rape by fraud, but also forecloses any line-drawing prob-
lems.201
2. Juvenile's Legal Incapacity to Consent.-A general precept of the
law of statutory rape is that a person below the age of consent is deemed le-
gally incapable of consenting.2 2 Therefore, juveniles obtaining intercourse
by adult impersonation are legally incapable of consenting to the inter-
course and thus, one might argue, cannot be criminally liable for rape by
fraud.
But lack of consent, whether from legal incapacity or otherwise, is not
a bar to criminal liability for rape. A rape perpetrator's lack of consent is
not a defense.0 3 Similarly, a perpetrator's consent is not an element of the
offense of rape.204 As a result, a juvenile's lack of consent to the intercourse
is irrelevant to the juvenile's liability for perpetrating rape by fraud. °5
200 True, the recognized category of spousal impersonation does entail for the victim the slim possi-
bility of criminal liability for adultery or fornication. But prosecution of adultery or fornication is ex-
ceedingly unlikely and even if convicted, a defendant would not receive the severe punishment that
might befall the victim of adult impersonation-twenty years of incarceration for statutory rape. See
supra notes 10, 26-29 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., Puttkammer, supra note 17, at 422 n.45 (acknowledging that obtaining intercourse by
spousal impersonation could constitute rape by fraud because it can "be confined within clear and
knowable limits").
202 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(a) (McKinney 2004) ("A person is deemed incapable of
consent when he or she is: (a) less than seventeen years old .... ); People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d
315, 324 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting "the statutory presumption that a person under 18 years of age
is incapable of giving legal consent" (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006)));
McBride v. Commonwealth, 605 S.E.2d 773, 775 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that a juvenile under
the age of fifteen "'cannot legally consent to the act [of intercourse]"' (quoting Buzzard v. Common-
wealth, 114 S.E. 664, 666-67 (1922))); see also supra note 2; infra notes 219-20.
203 Alan Wertheimer explains how a minor may be held criminally liable for intercourse to which
s/he is legally incapable of consenting:
Consider the distinction between consent and culpability. We may think that a minor does not
have the capacity to consent to some transaction, but that she can be held responsible for violating
the law or a moral principle .... [V]alid consent may require the capacity to understand and act
upon one's long-term interests, whereas culpability may require only the capacity to understand
and follow a law or principle.
WERTHEIMER, supra note 59, at 222.
204 See, e.g., In re Jessie C., 565 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("Although victims un-
der the age of 17 are deemed incapable of consenting to intercourse .. . respondent [a 13-year-old
charged with statutory rape] is not a victim. Respondent is charged with perpetrating sexual intercourse.
Simply stated, respondent's consent is not an essential element of the crime."). Consider, for example,
Oregon's rape statute which, like other states' statutes, does not include the perpetrator's consent to the
intercourse as an element of the offense:
(1) A person who has sexual intercourse with another person commits the crime of rape in the
first degree if:
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3. No Accomplice Liability for Statutory Rape Victims.-A general
principle of criminal law is that one cannot be both accomplice to and vic-
tim of the same criminal offense."0 6 This principle applies to statutory rape
victims:" 7 "statutory rape law was enacted to protect young females from
immature decisions to have sexual intercourse; the legislature considers her
to be the victim of the offense. It would conflict with legislative intent,
therefore, if she could be prosecuted as a secondary party to her own statu-
tory rape."208 One might argue that this principle bars a juvenile from rape-
by-fraud liability arising from the same intercourse by which s/he is a vic-
tim of statutory rape.
But claiming that a victim should not be criminally liable as a perpe-
trator of a different crime misapplies the principle. The principle is that a
victim of a crime should not be criminally liable as an accomplice to that
crime. Thus, the principle that bars a statutory rape victim from criminal
liability as an accomplice to the very same statutory rape does not extend to
barring criminal liability as a perpetrator for a crime distinct from statutory
rape-rape by fraud.
4. The Rape Victim Cannot Be the Rape Perpetrator.-One cannot
be both a victim and perpetrator of rape with respect to the same act of in-
tercourse. When a juvenile and an adult engage in intercourse, the law of
statutory rape treats only the juvenile as the victim.2"9 Thus, one might ar-
(a) The victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the person;
(b) The victim is under 12 years of age;
(c) The victim is under 16 years of age and is the person's sibling, of the whole or half blood,
the person's child or the person's spouse's child; or
(d) The victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental defect, mental incapacitation or
physical helplessness.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.375 (2003).
205 If a juvenile's incapacity to consent to intercourse were a bar to rape liability, then no juvenile
could ever be criminally liable for rape. Because juveniles are, in fact, held liable for rape, see supra
note 30, their incapacity to consent is not a defense. For an account of perhaps the most well known in-
stance of juveniles being held criminally liable for raping an adult, see Laura L. Finley, The Central
Park Jogger: The Impact of Race on Rape Coverage, in 5 FAMOUS AMERICAN CRIMES AND TRIALS:
1981-2000, at 123, 132-37 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Steven Chermak eds., 2005) (chronicling juvenile de-
fendants, ranging in age from fourteen to sixteen, being convicted for raping a twenty-eight-year-old
woman). Four of the juveniles served seven years of their sentence before their convictions were va-
cated when another person confessed to committing the crime. Id. at 136, 138.
206 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985) ("[A]
person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a victim of that of-
fense ...."); DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 486 ("A person may not be prosecuted as an accomplice in the
commission of a crime if he is a member of the class of persons for whom the statute prohibiting the
conduct was enacted to protect.").
207 See, e.g., In re Meagan R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a statu-
tory rape victim "cannot be liable as either an aider or abettor or coconspirator to the crime of her own
statutory rape").
208 DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 486.
209 See supra text accompanying note 208.
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gue that a juvenile victim of statutory rape perpetrated by an adult cannot,
by the same act of intercourse, perpetrate rape by fraud against that adult.
Though the law of statutory rape does make the juvenile the victim, the
law of rape by fraud does not. Under the law of rape by fraud, obtaining in-
tercourse by adult impersonation may render the juvenile the perpetrator,
and the adult the victim. As a result of the operation of the law of both
types of rape, the juvenile is both victim (of statutory rape) and perpetrator
(of rape by fraud); the adult is also both victim (of rape by fraud) and perpe-
trator (of statutory rape). But in no way does the juvenile's status as a vic-
tim under statutory rape law preclude the juvenile from being a perpetrator
under rape-by-fraud law."'
5. Chilling Effect on Statutory Rape Prosecutions.-One might argue
that recognizing adult impersonation as a basis for rape by fraud will chill
the prosecution of statutory rape. A juvenile will be less likely to press
statutory rape charges if doing so subjects the juvenile to prosecution for
rape by fraud.
Even assuming arguendo such a chilling effect, existing forms of rape
trigger the same effect. A juvenile pressing statutory rape charges is al-
ready potentially subject to accusations by the statutory rape defendant that
the juvenile raped the adult by force, coercion, or fraud (apart from adult
impersonation). Whatever chilling effect these have on statutory rape
prosecutions is apparently not deemed a sufficient basis to abolish or refuse
to recognize these types of rape. As a result, the prospect of a chilling ef-
fect on statutory rape prosecutions is similarly an insufficient basis to refuse
to recognize adult impersonation as a form of rape by fraud.2"
210 For a discussion of why the adult's status as rape by fraud victim should provide a defense to
statutory rape, but the juvenile's status as statutory rape victim should not provide a defense to rape by
fraud, see infra note 250 and accompanying text.
211 The recognition of adult impersonation as rape by fraud may create the positive effect of chilling
the incidence of juveniles engaging in intercourse as well as the negative effect of chilling statutory rape
prosecutions. The harm of chilling statutory rape prosecutions is that it may undermine the deterrent
effect on engaging in intercourse with juveniles thereby undermining the protection statutory rape laws
provide to juveniles from the adverse physical and psychological consequences of intercourse. See infra
notes 221-23 and accompanying text. But recognizing adult impersonation as a form of rape by fraud
may enhance the deterrent effect on engaging in intercourse with juveniles. Juveniles will be deterred
from misrepresenting their age as above the age of consent. This will decrease the incidence of juve-
niles engaging in intercourse and thereby reduce the incidence of juveniles suffering from the harmful
physical and psychological effects of intercourse. Thus, it is unclear whether recognizing adult imper-
sonation as rape by fraud will enhance or undermine the protection of juveniles from the harmful conse-
quences of intercourse.
Even if the negative chilling effect outweighs the positive chilling effect, this is not a sufficient basis
for refusing to recognize adult impersonation as rape by fraud. The threat of prosecution for statutory
rape will similarly create a negative chilling effect on adult victims of rape by fraud (via adult imper-
sonation) from coming forward and pressing charges. But that negative chilling effect is, of course, an
insufficient basis to refuse recognition of statutory rape liability. Likewise, a negative chilling effect on
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E. Conclusion
Obtaining intercourse by adult impersonation qualifies as rape by fraud
under the existing principles, standards, and tests employed in over thirty
jurisdictions." 2 Moreover, under many of these approaches adult imper-
sonation more convincingly qualifies as rape by fraud than currently ac-
cepted forms of rape by fraud. In particular, to the extent that most
jurisdictions recognize spousal impersonation as rape by fraud,213 then afor-
tiori most jurisdictions will recognize adult impersonation as rape by fraud.
Even apart from satisfying specific, existing legal standards, adult imper-
sonation satisfies perhaps the most fundamental basis for imposing rape-by-
fraud liability-serious harm befalling the defrauded victim. This prospect
of severe criminal punishment for the defrauded victim, unique to adult im-
personation among types of fraud, bypasses the oft-voiced concern of line-
drawing difficulties in recognizing new forms of rape by fraud. Given the
considerable support in existing caselaw and statutes for recognizing adult
impersonation as rape by fraud, the next Part considers the significance out-
side the law of rape by fraud.
III. A NEW DEFENSE TO STATUTORY RAPE
Recognition that obtaining intercourse by adult impersonation consti-
tutes rape by fraud lays the foundation for a new defense to the strict liabil-
ity offense of statutory rape. No statutory rape defendant has ever argued
for a defense based on being the victim of rape by fraud perpetrated by the
statutory rape victim. This Part broadly outlines the basis for this new de-
fense.2"4 It supplies a more persuasive basis for exculpation than the honest
and reasonable mistake-of-age defense already adopted in over twenty ju-
risdictions." 5 But while the mistake-of-age defense requires a departure
from the strict liability rule, our new defense does not. By applying even
within a strict liability approach, it would succeed where the mistake-of-age
defense has failed. Before explicating this new defense, the next section
presents an overview of statutory rape law.
juvenile victims of statutory rape is also an insufficient basis to refuse recognition of adult impersona-
tion as rape by fraud.
212 See supra Part II.A-C. For a list of the jurisdictions in which obtaining intercourse by adult im-
personation qualifies as rape by fraud, see infra Appendix.
213 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
214 A more comprehensive analysis of how recognizing adult impersonation as rape by fraud might
furnish a defense to statutory rape will be the focus of a future article.
215 See supra note 40.
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A. Overview of the Law of Statutory Rape
The offense of statutory rape 216 consists of intercourse with a person
younger than a specified age, typically sixteen."1 7 The offense is committed
regardless of whether the perpetrator uses force or the underage victim ac-
quiesces to the intercourse."1 8 The underlying rationale is that a person
younger than the specified age lacks the maturity to give sufficiently in-
formed consent.2"9 As a result, juveniles are often deemed legally incapable
of giving valid, effective consent.22° The purpose of the offense is to protect
juveniles both from older, more experienced sexual predators as well as
from themselves.22 ' Although juveniles may have some interest in inter-
course, the law affords them protection from their own interests because
216 "[T]his variety of rape came to be known as 'statutory rape,' apparently because it was originally
engrafted onto the common law by statute, and that term is so used even today notwithstanding the fact
that now statutes virtually everywhere encompass the totality of the crime of rape." LAFAVE, supra note
6, at 778. Few jurisdictions, however, actually designate this crime as statutory rape, but instead use a
variety of other terms. See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 314 n.2 (noting that statutory rape is variously
termed as "sexual conduct with a minor," "sexual abuse of a minor," "statutory sexual seduction," and
"felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile," among others). For an interesting account of three theories un-
derlying statutory rape law--conservative, liberal, and radical-see, Keith Burgess-Jackson, Statutory
Rape: A Philosophical Analysis, 8 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 139, 145-51 (1995).
217 See Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in
the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 708 (2006) ("The law against statutory rape . . . is
meant to target the sex partners of older teens (those between fourteen and seventeen) who engage in
factually consensual sex (i.e., they do not employ 'force' within the meaning of the rape law)."); see
also supra note 2.
218 While the traditional conception of rape is intercourse by force and without the consent of the
victim, see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 275 (Official Code and Revised Comments, 1985)
(noting that rape was traditionally understood as intercourse "by force and against her will"), the offense
of statutory rape may be committed in the absence of both. See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 516 S.E.2d 195,
198 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (contrasting rape "by force and against the will" of the victim with statutory
rape which may involve consensual intercourse); CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 871 (2001)
("Under laws criminalizing sex with children, childhood substitutes for both force and lack of con-
sent.").
219 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 276 (explaining that the original rationale for the
offense "was that a child under a certain age should be regarded by the law as incapable of giving effec-
tive consent"). Noted rape scholar Catharine MacKinnon articulates the law's understanding of imma-
turity, as measured by chronological age, precluding the capacity for consent to intercourse:
At law, children are considered incapable of withholding or giving consent to sex: partly because
they may not know what they are doing or what is being done to them, or the meaning of what
they are being asked or told to do; partly because they will often do what adults ask, whether they
want to or not. Whatever the reason their will is considered incompetent or immaterial.
MACKINNON, supra note 218, at 871.
220 See, e.g., State v. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Wis. 2004) ("The [statutory rape] statute is
based on a policy determination by the legislature that persons under the age of sixteen are not compe-
tent to consent to sexual contact or sexual intercourse."); see also supra notes 2, 202.
221 See, e.g., Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d at 817 ("The state has a strong interest in the ethical and moral
development of its children, and this state has a long tradition of honoring its obligation to protect its
children from predators and from themselves."); Britton Guerrina, Comment, Mitigating Punishment for
Statutory Rape, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1261 (1998) ("Paternalism motivates this understanding of
statutory rape: adolescent females must be protected from themselves.").
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they may not fully understand the risks or consequences of pregnancy,"'
procreation, and venereal disease. 23
Some critics and feminists counter that criminalizing intercourse with
juveniles, not intercourse per se, is what harms juveniles. Statutory rape
laws are said to smack of "[p]aternalism,. 224 "reflect and reinforce archaic
assumptions about the . . . weakness and naivet6 of young women," '225 and
could undermine abortion rights.226 Frances Olsen captures the dilemma
confronting feminists:
These laws pose a classic political dilemma for feminists. On one hand, they
protect females; like laws against rape, incest, child molestation, and child
marriage, statutory rape laws are a statement of social disapproval of certain
forms of exploitation. To some extent they reduce abuse and victimization.
On the other hand, statutory rape laws restrict the sexual activity of young
women and reinforce the double standard of sexual morality.227
On this account, statutory rape laws protect as they disempower.225
222 For example, the United States Supreme Court found that prevention of teenage pregnancies is
one of the principal purposes of California's statutory rape law:
The justification for the statute offered by the State, and accepted by the Supreme Court of
California, is that the legislature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies ....
We are satisfied not only that the prevention of illegitimate pregnancy is at least one of the
"purposes" of the statute, but also that the State has a strong interest in preventing such pregnancy.
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981); see also Levine, supra note
217, at 709 ("In the mid-1990s, states across the United States took a closer look at their statutory rape
laws as part of a broader campaign to reduce teenage pregnancy and welfare reliance.").
223 E.g., Michael M, 450 U.S. at 470 ("Some legislators may have been concerned about preventing
teenage pregnancies, others about protecting young females from physical injury or from the loss of
'chastity,' and still others about promoting various religious and moral attitudes towards premarital
sex."); Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 52 (Md. 1999) (noting that statutory rape laws are designed to
minimize the risks to the victims that include "potential physical harm, including the risk of venereal
diseases, especially the HIV virus, trauma, and even permanent damage to a child's organs"); People v.
Gonzalez, 561 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361-62 (Westchester County Ct. 1990) (same).
224 Guerrina, supra note 221, at 1261.
225 Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 9, 18 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
226 See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 75 (1994) ("[Statutory rape] laws which treat minors as insuf-
ficiently mature to consent to sex might easily become ammunition for those wishing to restrict minors'
access to reproductive health care.").
227 Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387,
401-02 (1984).
228 See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory
Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 757 (2000) (chronicling the "tension between the protective and the patri-
archal impulses underlying statutory rape law"). Although traditionally statutory rape law limited the
class of offenders to males and the class of victims to females, "[tioday, the vast majority of these laws
are neutral with respect to the gender of potential offender and victim." BONNIE ET AL., supra note 66,
at 400. For accounts noting that increasingly the perpetrators are female and the victims are male, see
Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 380-88 (2006); Kate Zernike, The
Siren Song of Sex with Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. I1, 2005, § 4, at 3.
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Also controversial is the application of strict liability. Under strict li-
ability, a defendant's mens rea is irrelevant. While other defenses are still
applicable, defenses negating the defendant's mens rea are not. 29 Since the
landmark 1875 English case, Regina v. Prince,23 ° statutory rape was uni-
formly considered a strict liability offense in America with respect to the
element of the age of the victim.3 ' That is, a defendant's honest and rea-
sonable mistake as to the age of the victim is not a defense.232 For example,
in a jurisdiction prohibiting intercourse with persons younger than sixteen
years of age, a defendant who has intercourse with a fifteen-year old, but
who honestly and reasonably believes the juvenile is seventeen, would
nonetheless commit statutory rape.233
229 See supra note 3. For a discussion of the ambiguity surrounding the term strict liability, see, for
example, Husak, supra note 3, at 189-90 (identifying at least seven different varieties of strict liability
and suggesting that "it may seem sensible to recommend that the term 'strict liability' should be ban-
ished from the legal vocabulary"); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability
Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 417 (1993) ("The precise meaning of 'strict liability offenses' is un-
clear.").
230 (1875) 2 L.R.C.C.R. 138. For a brief discussion of the case, see supra note I and infra note 23 1.
231 See, e.g., Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake ofAge: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64
MICH. L. REV. 105, 111 (1965) ("Despite having been soon overruled, Prince initiated a trend which
was universally followed in American jurisdictions for the next eighty-nine years; statutory rape in
America thus fell into a class of cases at variance with the reasonable-mistake-of-fact doctrine."). For
further critical discussion of Prince's influence on statutory rape law in America, see Garnett v. State,
632 A.2d 797, 812-14 (Md. 1993) (Bell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the theory of the case as unpersua-
sive); State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 781 (R.I. 1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[a]
united front of modem legal commentators lambastes [Prince's reasoning] . . . as without precedent or
foundation in the criminal law."). For defenses of Prince, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 653-56 (1984); Dan
M. Kahan, Is Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2123, 2123-26
(1998).
232 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
233 Some jurisdictions require that the perpetrator be a specified number of years older than the vic-
tim. See supra note 2. If such a jurisdiction required an age differential of, for example, more than three
years, then the defendant could only be convicted if s/he is nineteen years of age or older. Some states
adopt a "two-tiered approach" featuring both absolute age and age differential elements. WERTHEIMER,
supra note 59, at 216 ("A female under a specified age (say fourteen) may be unable to give transforma-
tive [legally effective] consent whatever the age of her partner. But if the female is within a certain age
range (say fourteen to sixteen), she cannot give legally transformative consent to a partner who is sig-
nificantly older .... ).
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This strict liability rule has been much criticized by commentators234
and was even abrogated in England only ten years after Prince.235 Many ob-
ject that strict liability is anathema to the criminal law236 and violates "the
venerable principle that actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea."'237 Even
where strict liability is grudgingly accepted, it is generally reserved for pub-
lic welfare and regulatory offenses238 that typically entail fines or other
234 See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMNAL LAW 728 (1978) ("The courts seem no
longer to reason about the issue. The claims of the defense [as to mistake of age] are rejected with a
ritualistic allusion to protecting young females and defendants' acting at their peril.... [L]egislative re-
form appears to be the only likely path for ameliorating the influence of Prince .. "); Carpenter, supra
note 4, at 320 (arguing that "statutory rape should no longer be treated as a strict liability crime, and de-
fendants should be able to mount a reasonable mistake-of-age defense"); Myers, supra note 231, at 136
("Judicial responsibility is long overdue in exposing statutory rape laws as an 'ethereal structure of fic-
tions' which for so long has artificially protracted American childhood."); Comment, Forcible and
Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J.
55, 78-79 (1952) (arguing against strict liability for statutory rape and advocating an affirmative defense
based on the victim's actual consent being sufficiently informed to be legally effective).
235 See Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69 § 5, reprinted in 5 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 907-08 (2d ed. 1948) (supplying an express defense for mistake of age of the
victim for the offense of defilement of a girl between the ages of thirteen and sixteen).
236 E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted ... [with mens rea] is no provincial or transient notion. It is...
universal and persistent in mature systems of law."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. at 282 (Official
Code and Revised Comments, 1985) ("[The Code] makes a frontal attack on... strict liability in the pe-
nal law."); DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 146 ("Most modem criminal law scholars look unkindly upon the
abandonment of the mens rea requirement."); FLETCHER, supra note 234, at 729-30 ("[Many] instances
of strict liability ignore the principles of just and proportional punishment .... Punishing according to
the degree of objective wrong, regardless of the actor's accountability for the wrong, is to mock the clas-
sical principles of just punishment."); Husak, supra note 3, at 189 ("Little about strict liability has
evoked much agreement among commentators except for their opposition to it."); cf. Herbert L. Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107 ("Mens rea is an important require-
ment, but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.").
237 State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 775 (R.I. 1998) (Flanders, J., dissenting). Consider the following
invocation of the principle to criticize the decision to treat statutory rape as a strict liability offense:
This decision... spurns one of the most fundamental principles of the criminal law.
The essence of our system of criminal justice, familiar to any first-year law student, is the ven-
erable principle that actus nonfacit reum, nisi mens sit rea; or in other words, a criminal act flows
only from the "concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand."
Id. (quoting A>.orissette, 342 U.S. at 251).
238 Joshua Dressier supplies the following concise account of the rise of malum prohibitum, public
welfare offenses:
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Anglo-American crimes almost exclusively involved
conduct malum in se (inherently wrongful), such as murder, rape, and robbery. Conviction for
such offenses, which required mens rea, was gravely stigmatizing, and the penalties for their viola-
tion were severe.
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution . .. Congress and state legislatures enacted laws, most
of which contained no express mens rea requirement, that came to be characterized as "public wel-
fare offenses." Such offenses, in contrast to traditional crimes, involve conduct malum prohibitum
(wrong because it is prohibited). Examples include statutes that prohibit the manufacture or sale
of impure food or drugs to the public, anti-pollution environmental laws, as well as traffic and mo-
tor-vehicle regulations.
101:75 (2007) Adult Impersonation
forms of mild punishment. 239 But statutory rape is a very serious malum in
se240 crime subjecting a defendant to possibly twenty years' imprison-
ment,241 or even longer.242  Defenders of strict liability argue, as statutory
rape scholar Catherine Carpenter explains, "that it serves as an appropriate
substitute for mens rea because the actor is not entirely blameless. Culpa-
bility arises from the actor's assumption of the risk in engaging in sexual in-
tercourse with someone who might be underage. ' 243  But, as Laurie
Levenson notes, "the dominant view appears to be that in the Anglo-
American culture, the use of strict liability crimes is arbitrary and unreason-
able."' 4
Despite these objections, strict liability with respect to the age of the
victim remains the majority rule for statutory rape.245 The majority rule de-
nies a defense not only where the fact-finder determines that the defendant
DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 144-45.
239 The following account expresses the view that as a non-public-welfare offense, statutory rape
should not be a strict liability offense:
To lump such a crime [statutory rape] with petty gambling or commercial mislabeling belittles the
gravity of [statutory rape] .... Conversely, the degree of punishment and societal opprobrium be-
fitting [statutory rape] ... cannot be so cavalierly imposed without regard to the culpable intention
of the actor as can the light fines and slap-on-the-wrist penalties attached to typical public-welfare
offenses.
Yanez, 716 A.2d at 781 (Flanders, J., dissenting); see also DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 146 ("[S]trict li-
ability non-public-welfare offenses [the principal example of which is statutory rape] are aberrant and
especially controversial.").
240 For a discussion of the distinction between malum in se offenses and malum prohibitum of-
fenses, see supra note 238.
241 E.g., Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 801 (Md. 1993) ("Statutory rape, carrying the stigma of
felony as well as a potential sentence of 20 years in prison, contrasts markedly with the other strict li-
ability regulatory offenses and their light penalties.").
242 See supra note 11.
243 Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration
Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 321 (2006); see also infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
244 Levenson, supra note 229, at 403 n.7.
245 See supra notes 3-6. Prior to People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 677-78 (Cal. 1964) (reversing
a conviction for statutory rape and allowing a defense based on the defendant's lack of criminal intent
due to an honest and reasonable mistake as to the victim's age), statutory rape was regarded as a strict
liability offense with respect to the age of the victim in all fifty states. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks,
841 F.2d 268, 270 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[S]tatutory rape was universally regarded as a strict liability offense
until well into the twentieth century."); State v. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Wis. 2004) ("[T]he
traditional approach [to statutory rape], originally accepted in virtually every state ... is to impose strict
liability regarding the age of the victim."); LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 779 ("[S]tarting in 1964, some
courts began to recognize that a statutory rape defendant was entitled to a defense of reasonable mistake
of fact regarding the victim's age." (citing Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 678)). For jurisdictions following
Hernandez in allowing some form of honest and reasonable mistake-of-age defense to statutory rape,
see, for example, State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 838-39 (Alaska 1978) (finding a constitutional right of
due process for the defendant to offer evidence as to mistake of age as a defense to statutory rape); Perez
v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (N.M. 1990) (holding that defendant may offer defense of mistake of age
where the victim is between the ages of thirteen and sixteen); State v. Ballinger, 93 S.W.3d 881, 891
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (reversing defendant's conviction for statutory rape where trial court refused to
instruct jury on defendant's mistake-of-age defense).
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honestly and reasonably believed the juvenile to be of age, but also even
where the juvenile falsely represented being of age.246 But the recognition
that obtaining intercourse by adult impersonation constitutes rape by fraud
may lay the foundation for a new defense.
B. Foundation for the New Defense
If a juvenile rapes an adult (for example, at gunpoint), should the adult
be criminally liable for statutory rape for that very intercourse?247 Of course
not. Therefore, if a juvenile rapes by adult impersonation, the adult victim
should not be criminally liable for statutory rape for that very intercourse.
If charged with statutory rape, the adult victim should have a defense. The
defense is based not only on an honest and reasonable mistake of age and
the juvenile's false representation, but also that the juvenile's false repre-
sentation rises to the level of fraud sufficiently serious to warrant condem-
nation as the crime of rape. Mistake of age and misrepresentation of age
have been raised as defenses, both individually and jointly, and roundly re-
jected by the courts.248 But these claims have never before been made in
conjunction with the additional claim that the juvenile's misrepresentation
is sufficiently material to constitute one of the law's most grave crimes-
rape.
249
One who is fraudulently induced into engaging in intercourse (and that
fraud qualifies as rape by fraud), should not be criminally liable for that
very act of intercourse. In reliance on the statutory rape victim's false rep-
resentation, the statutory rape defendant agrees to engage in the intercourse.
Only after, and because of, the juvenile's fraudulent and criminal conduct
does the adult rape-by-fraud victim engage in the intercourse constituting
246 See, e.g., Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d at 817 (stating that the majority rule is to bar a mistake-of-age
defense "no matter how reasonable the defendant's belief that the victim was old enough to consent, and
no matter that the belief is based on the victim's own representations"); Carpenter, supra note 4, at 353
("[C]ourts find it irrelevant that the victim may have actively concealed or lied about his or her age.");
see also supra notes 4-6.
247 See supra text preceding and following note 37.
248 E.g., Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 45 (Md. 1999) (affirming conviction of statutory rape despite
defendant's undisputed evidence that victim admitted falsely representing her age to defendant as being
above the age of consent); Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 799 (Md. 1993) (upholding trial court's de-
termination that victim's false representation of being above the age of consent is immaterial to charge
of statutory rape); Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d at 823 (barring a defense to statutory rape "predicated on a
child's intentional misrepresentation of her age"). For additional cases where the statutory rape victim
falsely represented his or her age, see Carpenter, supra note 4, at 351-52, 352 n.217, 352 n.219, and 353
n.226; Carpenter, supra note 243, at 318 n.103.
One jurisdiction limits a mistake-of-age defense to when it is based on the victim's false representa-
tion of age. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.030(2) (West 2000) (allowing a mistake-of-age de-
fense only if proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it was "based upon declarations as to age
by the alleged victim").
249 See supra note 22.
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statutory rape.25 Criminal liability should not attach to one who becomes a
perpetrator of statutory rape because s/he became a victim of rape by fraud.
In broader terms, one should not be criminally liable for statutory rape for
the very act of intercourse by which one is a victim of rape.
C. Elements, Application, and Scope of Defense
Perhaps the best way to appreciate how this defense might practically
apply is to compare it with the principal defense to statutory rape. Follow-
ing People v. Hernandez, over twenty states now allow some form of mis-
take-of-age defense.25" ' The only requisite element is that (1) the defendant
honestly and reasonably believed that the victim was of age. Demonstrat-
ing that (2) the victim affirmatively misrepresented being of age to the de-
fendant is helpful, but unnecessary. Also not a requisite element, the
victim's misrepresentation has recently been characterized as (3) fraud.252
So under the minority rule, satisfaction of only the first element is necessary
to obtain a defense; under the majority rule of strict liability, satisfaction of
even all three elements is insufficient.
Our new defense requires additional elements. The juvenile's fraudu-
lent misrepresentation as to being of age must be (4) sufficiently serious
and material to make the defrauded adult a victim of rape by fraud. Though
jurisdictions' criteria for rape by fraud vary, some possible additional ele-
ments that a jurisdiction might impose could include that the misrepresenta-
tion was (4a) uttered to mislead the defendant, (4b) intended to induce the
defendant to engage in intercourse with the juvenile, and (4c) relied on in
forming the defendant's honest and reasonable belief that the juvenile was
of age 3.2 " Also, a jurisdiction might well require that (5) the defendant
proves the above elements by a preponderance of the evidence. A jurisdic-
tion should not require, however, that the juvenile be convicted of, or even
charged with, rape by fraud. The statutory rape defendant should remain
eligible for the defense regardless. The defendant need only establish that
the juvenile, in fact, committed rape by fraud.
As the above comparison demonstrates, this new defense is both
stronger and narrower than the Hernandez mistake-of-age defense. It af-
fords a stronger basis for a defense in that the defendant is not merely mis-
taken about the juvenile's age, but also is the victim of rape by fraud
perpetrated by the juvenile. And by requiring these additional elements the
250 For this reason, (i) the adult's status as rape victim should be the basis for a defense to statutory
rape liability; and, (ii) the juvenile's status as statutory rape victim should not be the basis for a defense
to rape by fraud.
251 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964). For a discussion of Hernandez and its influence, see supra notes 38-
40 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 22.
253 For a discussion of some of these possible requirements, see State v. Blake, 777 A.2d 709, 711-
12 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); supra Part II.A.2.c.
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defense will apply to an appreciably narrower class of defendants. As a re-
sult, this seemingly radical defense is actually more modest and limited
than the defense recognized for over forty years and accepted in over
twenty jurisdictions.2 54
While available to a narrower class of defendants, this new defense is
applicable in a greater number of jurisdictions, and it applies even under the
majority rule of strict liability. In contrast, the mistake-of-age defense fails
under strict liability because the defendant's mens rea regarding the age of
the juvenile is irrelevant. As such, the assertion of a mistake that would ne-
gate the defendant's mens rea is also irrelevant. Thus, recognizing the Her-
nandez defense requires a jurisdiction to depart from strict liability.
Recognizing the new defense, however, requires no such departure. Not
predicated on negating mens rea, this new defense is not barred by strict li-
ability. Even if strict liability fairly requires an adult to assume the risk that
a sexual partner will turn out to be underage, it cannot require an adult to
assume the risk of being raped.255
Because this defense is stronger, narrower, and works within a strict li-
ability framework, it could succeed where the Hernandez defense has
failed. Jurisdictions following the majority rule of strict liability could con-
tinue disallowing a mistake-of-age defense while allowing this new de-
fense. Even under strict liability, one should not be criminally liable as a
perpetrator of statutory rape for the very act of intercourse by which one is a
victim of rape.
D. Objections
This section anticipates the following four possible objections to this
new defense. First, being a rape victim is no defense to a charge of perpe-
trating statutory rape. That is, two wrongs do not make a right. Second, al-
lowing this defense undermines the goals of criminalizing intercourse with
juveniles. Third, the defense qualifies as blaming the victim. And fourth,
by engaging in intercourse one assumes the risk that one's sexual partner
will turn out to be underage. We will rebut each of these possible objec-
tions.
1. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right.-One might argue that the
adult being the victim of rape by fraud as perpetrated by the juvenile should
not (and does not) relieve the adult of criminal liability for statutory rape.
An adult's reasonable reliance on a juvenile's material misrepresentation of
being of age does not supply a defense under a strict liability approach.
And it should not even if the juvenile making the material misrepresentation
thereby perpetrates rape by fraud against the adult. Two wrongs do not
make a right.
254 See supra notes 38-40, 245 and accompanying text.
255 For an elaboration of this point, see infra Part III.D.4.
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To assess this objection consider the following hypothetical. Suppose
a juvenile commits rape by fraud against an adult wife by impersonating her
husband. 256 By simply being the victim of this rape by fraud the adult wife
perpetrates statutory rape.257 But as the victim of rape by fraud, should the
adult be liable for statutory rape? Did the adult affirmatively do anything
that should subject her to statutory rape liability other than become a rape-
by-fraud victim? The answer to both questions is, presumably, no. Since
the adult victim of rape by fraud (via spousal impersonation) deserves a de-
fense to statutory rape, then the adult victim of rape by fraud (via adult im-
personation) likewise deserves a defense to statutory rape.
2. Undermines Policy Goal of Protecting Juveniles.-One might ar-
gue that allowing this new defense undermines the primary policy goal of
criminalizing intercourse with juveniles. Criminalizing statutory rape de-
ters intercourse with juveniles, thereby protecting them from the harmful
physical and psychological consequences of intercourse." 8 Granting this
new defense to statutory rape erodes the deterrent effect and the protection
the offense affords to juveniles. Therefore, one might argue, public policy
militates against recognizing the defense.
Even assuming arguendo the premise of the objection-that allowing
the defense decreases the deterrent effect and reduces the protection of ju-
veniles-the conclusion does not follow. Allowing this new defense un-
dermines the goals of statutory rape law less than the existing, mistake-of-
age defense to statutory rape. The mistake-of-age defense applies in much
broader circumstances than being the victim of rape by fraud via adult im-
personation.259  The new defense is narrower and more modest. If the
broader defense is not rejected as eroding the policy goals of statutory rape,
then neither should be the narrower, more limited defense.26
256 Suppose further that this occurs in a jurisdiction recognizing intercourse obtained by spousal im-
personation as rape by fraud. For a discussion of such jurisdictions, see supra Part l.B.2.
257 This hypothetical assumes that the adult wife satisfies the requisite elements of the typical statu-
tory rape offense by engaging in intercourse with an underage juvenile who is a sufficient number of
years younger than the adult. See, e.g., Blake, 777 A.2d at 713 ("All a person need do to violate [Con-
necticut's statutory rape law] is to (1) engage in sexual intercourse (2) with a person between the ages of
thirteen and fifteen, and (3) be at least two years older than such person."). For a further discussion of
the elements of statutory rape, see supra note 2 and text accompanying notes 216-218.
258 See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
259 See supra Part III.C.
260 Because this new defense is narrower and more modest, even jurisdictions rejecting the mistake-
of-age defense might well recognize this new defense. Of course, this might not completely allay the
concerns of jurisdictions rejecting a mistake-of-age defense. That the new defense undermines the pro-
tection of juveniles, even to some limited extent, militates against its recognition in such jurisdictions.
But this limited loss of protection to juveniles must be balanced against the fundamental unfairness of
criminalizing as statutory rape the status of being an adult victim of rape by fraud. The importance of
avoiding such a fundamentally unfair result outweighs the limited loss of protection to juveniles. For an
argument that recognizing adult impersonation as rape by fraud will promote the protection of juveniles,
see supra note 211.
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3. Blaming the Victim.-One might argue that by raising a defense to
statutory rape based on the conduct of the statutory rape victim, the defen-
dant is blaming the victim. By claiming that the statutory rape victim raped
(by fraud) the statutory rape defendant, the defendant is engaging in the im-
permissible tactic of blaming the victim.
While perhaps impermissible to blame a blameless victim, blaming a
blameworthy victim is permissible. For example, a defendant charged with
battery or homicide might properly argue as a defense that the battery or
homicide was a necessary and justifiable use of self-defense against the vic-
tim's unlawful and blameworthy aggression. Thus, the defense of self-
defense qualifies as a permissible victim-blaming defense. Similarly, the
law of rape by fraud might find that a juvenile obtaining intercourse by
spousal impersonation is a blameworthy rapist. If charged with statutory
rape the adult victim of the juvenile's rape by fraud (via spousal impersona-
tion) might permissibly raise a defense by blaming the blameworthy juve-
nile statutory rape victim. So too, an adult victim of rape by fraud (via
adult impersonation) might permissibly raise a defense by blaming the
blameworthy juvenile rape-by-fraud perpetrator/statutory rape victim. 26'
4. Adult Assumes Risk that Juvenile Is Underage.-One rationale for
applying strict liability to statutory rape is that the adult assumes the risk of
an underage sexual partner.262 Even where the partner both reasonably ap-
pears to be and claims to be of age, the adult assumes the risk that the part-
ner is underage.263 Since the adult assumes the risk, one might argue that
the adult does not deserve a defense to statutory rape.
While the assumption of risk that one's partner is underage is perhaps
understandable, assumption of the risk of being raped is not. Under the as-
sumption-of-risk rationale, holding an adult victim of rape by fraud crimi-
nally liable for statutory rape is to impose on the adult the assumption of
risk of being raped by an underage perpetrator. Since the law does not im-
261
261 In addition, the objection defeats itself, While the law of statutory rape declares the juvenile to
be the victim, the law of rape by fraud may declare the adult (defrauded by adult impersonation) to be
the victim. The adult victim of rape by fraud, if charged with statutory rape, could similarly argue that
the statutory rape prosecution is blaming the victim. The very objection against blaming the victim ap-
plied to bar the adult's defense to statutory rape also applies to block a statutory rape prosecution of an
adult rape by fraud victim. As a result, the objection neutralizes itself.
262 See, e.g., United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[Statutory rape law]
protects children from sexual abuse by placing the risk of mistake as to a child's age on an older, more
mature person."); Myers, supra note 23 1, at 119 ("Because of supposed policy reasons, the 'wrongdoer'
has traditionally been required to assume the risk of his actions in statutory rape."); see also supra text
accompanying note 243.
263 See, e.g., Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 54 (Md. 1999) ("Deterrence is accomplished by placing
the risk of an error in judgment as to a potential sex partner's age with the potential offender."); State v.
Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 822 (Wis. 2004) ("[S]trict liability regarding the age of the minor furthers
the legitimate government interest in protecting children from sexual abuse by placing the risk of mis-
take on the adult actor.").
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pose on one the assumption of risk of being raped, the law does not impose
the assumption of risk that one's rapist may turn out to be underage.
CONCLUSION
Although the issue has never arisen, obtaining intercourse by adult im-
personation already constitutes rape by fraud under the existing standards,
tests, and rationales utilized in over thirty jurisdictions. All that remains is
judicial recognition. And adult impersonation easily surmounts the chief
obstacle: if we allow this to be rape by fraud, where do we draw the line?
Adult impersonation's unique combination of degree and type of harmful
consequence suffered by the defrauded victim-the prospect of severe
criminal punishment for statutory rape-not only affords a stronger basis
for rape-by-fraud liability than widely accepted forms of rape by fraud but
also forecloses any line-drawing problems. The harmful consequence of
criminal liability for statutory rape thus supplies both a principled basis for,
and a practical limit on the scope of, rape-by-fraud liability.
Adult impersonation constituting rape by fraud also may lay the foun-
dation for a new defense to the strict liability offense of statutory rape. If a
juvenile rapes an adult, the adult victim should not be criminally liable for
statutory rape for that very intercourse. Therefore, if a juvenile rapes by
adult impersonation, the adult victim should not be criminally liable for
statutory rape for that very intercourse. Criminal liability should not attach
to one who becomes a perpetrator of statutory rape because s/he became a
victim of rape by fraud. Even the strict liability form of statutory rape can-
not impose on an adult the assumption of risk of being raped.
This Article concludes that what statutory rape law bars as a defense
supplies the basis for a new form of rape by fraud; in turn, this new form of
rape by fraud supplies the basis for a new defense to statutory rape. Adult
impersonation both constitutes a new form of the offense of rape by fraud
and lays the foundation for a new defense to the strict liability offense of
statutory rape.
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APPENDIX: JURISDICTIONS & STANDARDS UNDER WHICH OBTAINING
INTERCOURSE BY ADULT IMPERSONATION MAY CONSTITUTE RAPE BY
FRAUD 264
Standards of Fraud and Consent
Fraud w/o Nature of Essential Material- Identity Spousal Global Knowing
Limit. 265  Act 266  Charac. 
6 7 ity26 8  Fraud269  Impers.
270  Consent27 1 Consent 272
Ala. X X X
Ariz. X X

































M.P.C. X X X
264 Either via statute or caselaw, thirty-three states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Military Code, and the
Model Penal Code supply standards of fraud, types of fraud, or conceptions of consent that support
criminalizing adult impersonation as rape by fraud.
265 See supra Part II.A.1.
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266 See supra Part l.A.2.a.
267 See supra Part l.A.2.b.
268 See supra Part II.A.2.c.
269 See supra Part l.B. 1.
270 See supra Part II.B.2.
271 See supra Part IlCI.
272 See supra Part II.C.2.
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